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Personal Delegations
Alexander A. Boni-Saenz†
INTRODUCTION
Donald and Gloria Luster married on October 5, 1963 and
had four children.1 Donald retired in 2005, and it was about this
time when Jeannine Childree, his youngest daughter and a
registered nurse, noticed that he was exhibiting signs of dementia.2
After a number of consultations with doctors, Donald was officially
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease in 2009 due to his memory loss,
disorientation, and other cognitive impairments.3 Based on these
medical evaluations, a Connecticut probate court declared Donald
incapable of handling his personal or financial affairs and
appointed Jeannine and his other daughter, Jennifer Dearborn, as
his guardians.4 Shortly thereafter, Gloria filed for a legal separation
from Donald, and in response, the daughters counterclaimed for
divorce, suspecting their mother of financial and emotional
abuse.5 Should the guardian-daughters have the authority to
sue for divorce on behalf of their father?6
†
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1
See Luster v. Luster, No. FA094010779S, 2011 LEXIS 1844, at *3-4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 20, 2011).
2
See id. at *6-7.
3
See id. at *8, *10.
4
See id. at *11.
5
See id. at *1. There was in fact evidence that Gloria had dissipated marital
assets, using a durable power of attorney that may have been signed after Donald lost
capacity. See id. at *11-17. There was also some evidence of emotional abuse. See id. at

1231

1232

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

In 2000, Joe Thomas Garrett died after a bout with lung
cancer.7 About a week before he died, he signed a durable
power of attorney and approved a will.8 The power of attorney
designated Joe’s brother, Larry, as attorney-in-fact, and the
will poured Joe’s assets into a trust bearing Joe’s name.9 Its
trustees were Carolynne (Joe’s wife), and Larry, and its assets
would be distributed at Caroylnne’s death, with only two
percent going to one of Joe’s daughters, Joni Hart.10 Although
Joni had only seen her father a handful of times since 1969, she
challenged the will on several grounds, including that Joe
lacked the mental capacity to execute it and that it was invalid
because it was actually executed by Larry.11 Assuming Joe
lacked decisional capacity, should Larry have the authority to
execute a will on his brother’s behalf?12
These types of questions are more familiar in the
health-care context, where the legal system has publicly
grappled with the difficulties of delegating the decision to
*9 (“The defendant [Donald] reported that the plaintiff would ask him ‘why are you still
alive[.]’”); id. at *9 (“The defendant was extremely frightened of the plaintiff [Gloria]
and felt unsafe in his own home.”).
6
Gloria moved to dismiss the daughters’ counterclaim, contending that
guardians’ powers are limited and that allowing guardians the power to divorce would
allow them to “bring dissolution of another’s marriage for a myriad of reasons including
financial gain or personal animosity.” See Luster v. Luster, 17 A.3d 1068, 1075 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2011). Judge Klaczak of the superior court agreed, noting that the majority
rule prohibited guardians from filing for divorce for their wards, as this was an
“intensely personal” decision and that there was an “inherent inability to know” what
Donald would have wanted in this situation. See Luster, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 63,
at *1-2. The appeals court reversed, focusing on the need for the representation of
Donald’s interests in court and the problem of leaving potentially abusive situations
unaddressed. See Luster, 17 A.3d at 1077-78. Gloria appealed, and the Supreme Court
of Connecticut granted certiorari on the question, but later dismissed the case for
failure to file a brief. See Luster v. Luster, 23 A.3d 1243 (Conn. 2011); Luster v. Luster,
SC 18820 (Conn. Apr. 13, 2012) (mem. dismissal). For a summary of the law in other
states, see infra Part I.B.3.
7
See In re Estate of Garrett, 100 S.W.3d 72, 73-74 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003).
8
See id. at 74.
9
Id. at 73-74.
10
See id.
11
Id. at 74-76.
12
The court’s answer was no. See id. at 76 (“Under a power of attorney, an
agent is authorized to act with respect to any and all matters on behalf of the principal
with the exception of those which, by their nature, by public policy, or by contract require
personal performance. The decision of who, what, when, and how one’s property is to be
distributed upon death is clearly personal and that of the principal alone, and thus falls
within the exception.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The court,
however, found that the will was validly executed by Joe himself and upheld it. See id.
(“Larry merely acted as a conduit or messenger between the decedent and Neihouse
[the attorney] concerning the decedent’s wishes because the decedent was ill and
unable to leave the hospital.”).
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withdraw life-sustaining treatment from individuals such as
Karen Ann Quinlan,13 Nancy Cruzan,14 and Terri Schiavo.15
Cases like these illustrate the important question of proxy
decision-making on personal matters, yet courts and legislatures
are divided on whether and how to delegate personal decisionmaking authority for individuals who suffer from cognitive
impairment. Nevertheless, this question’s importance in the
United States is unlikely to subside anytime soon. Millions of
people lack decisional capacity due to illness or accident, and
these numbers will only increase with an aging population.16
Further, the traditional lines of decision-making authority have
broken down as family and caregiving structures have changed.17
Thus, society will face more and more scenarios in which people
with cognitive impairments may require support or a proxy in
making crucial life decisions. While this reality presents many
difficult questions, it also creates an opportunity to rethink and
reevaluate how the law treats people with cognitive
impairments.18
The central claim of this article is that in the case of
decisional incapacity, decisions that implicate fundamental
human capabilities should generally be delegable. Thus, it
rejects the rationale employed by courts to justify
nondelegation—that these types of decisions are too personal to
be made by another. This line of reasoning confuses
nondelegation for nondecision, and it only serves to privilege a
status quo outcome over the expression of fundamental human
capabilities by individuals with cognitive impairments. The
primary normative framework that guides the analysis is the

13

See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
15
See In re Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
16
See Liesi E. Hebert et al., Alzheimer Disease in the US Population:
Prevalence Estimates Using the 2000 Census, 60 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY 1119, 1120
(2003) (estimating there are 4.5 million people in the United States with Alzheimer’s
disease and projecting that this number will increase to 13.2 million by 2050).
17
See ELAINE M. BRODY, WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE: THEIR PARENT CARE YEARS 722 (2d ed. 2004) (describing changing family structures); David T. Ellwood & Christopher
Jencks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families in the United States Since 1960, in THE
FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 30-37, 49-52 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds., 2004) (same).
18
These issues are not unique to the United States. Other countries also
grapple with how to treat certain types of decisions in the case of decisional incapacity.
See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH BGB (CIVIL CODE) §§ 1903-07 (delineating delegation
or nondelegation of authority for decisions about marriage, willmaking, sterilization,
and residence for those under custodianship in Germany).
14

1234

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

capabilities approach.19 It posits that capabilities, or the
freedoms or opportunities to achieve certain core functionings,
are the relevant metric for social justice. Access to the
capabilities that we consider fundamental to the human
experience, such as the capability to live a life that is not
arbitrarily cut short or the capability to have social affiliations,
must be provided on an adequate basis to all, including those
with cognitive impairment. Thus, most individuals who lack
decisional capacity should be free to exercise their fundamental
capabilities through, or with the assistance of, a surrogate. One
need not adhere to the capabilities approach, however, to
support some range of personal delegations. This article also
explores other normative arguments—including autonomy and
alternative conceptions of welfare—that might justify different
types of personal delegation regimes.
As a practical matter, this means that various personal
decisions, such as those involving divorce, estate planning, or
health care, should be delegable to surrogates in the event of
decisional incapacity. This delegation may be achieved either
through a springing durable power of attorney that specifically
delegates each of these decisions or through the guardianship
process. Oversight of attorneys-in-fact should be limited, while
advance judicial approval should be required for guardians who
have cognizable conflicts of interest or who are exercising
decision-making authority in a way that implies a likely conflict
of interest. However, since the court may lack the institutional
competence to review many of these personal decisions, its
review should be deferential. In the end, ensuring equal access
to such personal decisions through delegation is a crucial form
of empowerment that promotes the flourishing of those living
with cognitive impairment.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides the
background for understanding the field of personal delegations.
It reviews the mechanisms of personal delegation and surveys
the legal treatment of divorce, willmaking, and health care—the
three areas in which these questions have been most subject to
legal contestation. Part II argues for a rule that decisions that
implicate fundamental human capabilities should generally be
delegable. It then considers other normative arguments derived
from the traditional legal standards for surrogate decision19

See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES (2011); AMARTYA
SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985).
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making: substituted judgment and best interests. Part II also
addresses objections based on the notion that certain decisions
are too personal to be delegated to another. Part III examines
how personal delegations would work in practice by discussing
durable powers of attorney and guardianship, and it then
briefly reexamines the areas of divorce, wills, and health care.
I.

PERSONAL DELEGATIONS

Personal delegations are transfers of authority over
personal decisions to others.20 For the purposes of this article, I
define personal decisions as those that allow us to exercise our
fundamental human capabilities in meaningful ways.21 Examples
include the decisions to marry,22 vote,23 or travel.24 Many of these

20

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 491 (9th ed. 2009) (defining delegation as
“[t]he act of entrusting another with authority or empowering another to act as an
agent or representative”).
21
This definition clearly links up with the primary normative theory I
employ for much of my analysis: the capabilities approach. In Part II.B, I explore
alternative normative arguments and vary the definition of a personal decision
accordingly. While there is not a one-to-one match between the different normative
theories, and thus their definitions, there is at least some overlapping consensus as to
what would constitute a personal decision. See generally John Rawls, The Idea of an
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987) (applying the concept to
political justice).
I draw on Martha Nussbaum’s work to generate a list of fundamental
human capabilities. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 72-78 (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT]; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY,
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 69-81 (2006) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS]
(outlining ten core capabilities—life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses,
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play;
and control over one’s environment (political and material)). While one might disagree
with elements on her list, the specific decisions analyzed in this article are connected to
capabilities that most would likely consider fundamental. See infra Part I.B
(connecting health care, divorce, and testamentary decisions to fundamental
capabilities that are relatively uncontroversial).
22
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (stating that prior cases
characterize the right to marry as “among the personal decisions protected by the right
of privacy”). The term privacy, of course, has been strained to encompass a variety of
different interests that it supposedly protects. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex
Equality, Liberty, and Privacy: A Comparative Approach to the Feminist Critique, in
INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRACTICES, CONTROVERSIES 242 (Zoya Hasan et
al. eds., 2002).
23
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age.”); id. amend. XIX (“The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.”); id. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).
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types of decisions receive special protection through various
constitutional mechanisms.25 This article examines personal
delegations made in the context of decisional incapacity, or the
inability to make a specific type of decision entirely on one’s
own due to cognitive impairment.26 In particular, this article
focuses on those who once possessed decisional capacity but
have since lost it, whether due to illness or accident.27
This part reviews the legal architecture of delegations in
the event of decisional incapacity. With that basis, it then
turns to the legal treatment of personal delegations in three
illustrative areas—divorce, willmaking, and health care.28
While personal delegations potentially encompass a much
broader set of decisions, the law is most in flux and thus open
to contestation and litigation in these areas. In the first two
domains,
personal
decisions
have
historically
been
nondelegable. The rationale for nondelegation is the personal
nature of the decision, which is analyzed further in Part II.
24

See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (“The constitutional
right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the
concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and
repeatedly recognized.”); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)
(including among the fundamental rights of citizens the “right of a citizen of one state
to pass through, or to reside in any other state”).
25
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.”); Martha C. Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against
Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56-72 (2007) (demonstrating how the U.S.
Constitution actualizes many rights that contribute to various important capabilities).
26
See ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS 18
(1990) (“The statement that a particular individual is (or is not) competent is
incomplete. Competence is always competence for some task—competence to do
something . . . . [T]he notion of decision-making capacity is itself incomplete until the
nature of the choice as well as the conditions under which it is to be made are specified.
Thus competence is decision-relative, not global.”). Because those who currently lack
capacity could theoretically regain it, the delegations at issue are also revocable.
27
This excludes, for the moment, two populations: children and those who
never possessed decisional capacity.
28
Other scholars have examined nondelegation in the areas of wills and
divorce in isolation, but none have attempted to understand or theorize the field of
personal delegations as a whole. See, e.g., Mark Schwarz, Note, The Marriage Trap:
How Guardianship Divorce Bans Abet Spousal Abuse, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 187, 196
(2011) (discussing lack of delegation in divorce cases); Ralph C. Brashier, Policy,
Perspective, and the Proxy Will, 61 S.C. L. REV. 63, 102 (2009) (discussing state statutory
delegation powers over wills); Diane Snow Mills, Comment, “But I Love What’s-HisName”: Inherent Dangers in the Changing Role of the Guardian in Divorce Actions on
Behalf of Incompetents, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 527, 535-36 (2000); Kurt X.
Metzmeier, Note, The Power of the Incompetent Adult to Petition for Divorce Through a
Guardian or Next Friend, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 949, 957-58 (1994).

2013]

A.

PERSONAL DELEGATIONS

1237

The Legal Architecture of Delegation

The three primary legal mechanisms that govern the
delegation of decisions in the event of decisional incapacity are the
durable power of attorney, statutory surrogacy, and guardianship.29
For those who plan in advance, the durable power of attorney
permits the delegation of decision-making authority past the point
of incapacity.30 Originally used for delegation of financial decisionmaking, its use has now spread beyond the economic realm to the
health-care arena, as all states now have statutes addressing the
health-care power of attorney or its equivalent.31
For those who did not plan in advance, the law provides
for delegation through statutory surrogacy and guardianship.32
The former represents the norm in the health-care domain;
these statutes automatically empower surrogates when there is
a finding, typically by a physician, that a patient lacks decisional
capacity. They contain hierarchical lists of potential surrogates,
starting with the spouse and proceeding to more distant
familial relations.33 These statutory schemes have an advantage
29

There are, of course, informal or nonlegal delegations of personal decisionmaking authority as well. See Marshall B. Kapp, Who’s the Parent Here? The Family’s
Impact on the Autonomy of Older Persons, 41 EMORY L. J. 773, 773-78 (1992) (outlining
the domains in which the family/individual interaction plays out). For example, many
caregivers for those with cognitive impairments must make proxy decisions about
various personal activities of daily living, such as bathing, dressing, and eating. See S.
Katz et al., Studies of Illness in the Aged: The Index of ADL, 185 JAMA 94, 94-99
(1964) (listing activities of daily living); see also I. Rosow & N. Breslau, A Guttman
Health Scale for the Aged, 21 J. GERONTOLOGY 556, 556-59 (1966) (describing
instrumental activities of daily living). Sometimes these decisions are codified as
delegable in state statutes, but they are so uncontroversial that they almost never
come up in legal cases. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215 (West 2006) (delegating
decisions about social environment to guardians). The primary allocation mechanisms
for this type of labor and corresponding personal decision-making authority are gender
and familial status. While these allocation mechanisms must be interrogated, to do so
is outside the scope of this article.
30
The durable power of attorney is a relatively new phenomenon, having
been created in the 1950s to remedy the problem that at common law, incapacity of a
principal extinguished an agency relationship. See Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as an
Agent Under a Financial Durable Power of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 574, 576-78 (1996); see also Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Incompetent Principals,
Competent Third Parties, and the Law Agency, 61 IND. L.J. 115, 119-23 (1986)
(detailing how courts dealt with the durable power of attorney in the context of
economic transactions).
31
See Dorothy D. Nachman, Living Wills: Is It Time to Pull the Plug?, 18
ELDER L.J. 289, 316 (2011).
32
See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK, THE LAW OF LATER-LIFE HEALTH CARE AND
DECISION MAKING 171-75, 221-25 (2006).
33
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58.5 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (West 2008); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.039 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (2012). These
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over the guardianship process in that they quickly select a
decision-maker. A statutory scheme, however, requires an
institution, legal or nonlegal, to execute it. These statutes have
been employed in the health-care context primarily because the
medical profession and health-care institutions exist to serve in
this role.34 There is typically no judicial oversight of statutory
surrogates’ decision-making.
Finally, there is guardianship.35 When someone petitions
the court to place a person under guardianship, the court holds
a hearing to determine whether that person truly lacks capacity.
If so, the court determines what type of guardianship would be
appropriate given the ward’s decisional and functional
limitations, and who should serve as guardian.36 Most states
provide statutory guidelines for the selection of guardians, which

statutes are modeled after the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act or one of its
predecessor model statutes. The various state statutes’ priority lists do a reasonably
good job of reflecting patient preferences. See Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal,
Designating Health Care Decisionmakers for Patients Without Advance Directives: A
Psychological Critique, 42 GA. L. REV. 979, 1007 (2008).
34
See generally Matthew K. Wynia et al., Medical Professionalism in Society,
341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1612 (1999).
35
The state’s authority to do this derives from the doctrine of parens
patriae—the state’s power to take care of those in society who cannot take care of
themselves. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982)
(“Parens patriae means literally ‘parent of the country.’ The parens patriae action has
its roots in the common-law concept of the ‘royal prerogative.’ The royal prerogative
included the right or responsibility to take care of persons who ‘are legally unable, on
account of mental incapacity, whether it proceed from 1st. nonage: 2. idiocy: or 3.
lunacy: to take proper care of themselves and their property.’” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting, among others, J. CHITTY, PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 155 (1820))). For
parens patriae’s origins in English common law, see generally Lawrence B. Custer, The
Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978). For a critique of
the doctrine, see George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State
as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 914-15 (1976) (“Unchecked, however, this
power will lead to total intrusion by the state into the personal lives of its members.”).
36
In Roman law and English common law, the state delegated financial but
not personal decisions to the guardian of the ward. See Barbara A. Venesy, Comment,
1990 Guardianship Law Safeguards Personal Rights yet Protects Vulnerable Elderly,
24 AKRON L. REV. 161, 163 (1990). Modern guardianship law allows guardians to make
personal as well as financial decisions for a ward, and the court has the option of
creating one of four types of guardianship: guardianship of the person (granting
authority over personal decisions), guardianship of the estate (financial decisions),
plenary guardianship (both types of decisions), and limited guardianship (both types of
decisions, as tailored to the specific decisional incapacities of the ward). See LAWRENCE
A. FROLIK, THE LAW OF LATER-LIFE HEALTH CARE AND DECISION MAKING 165-81 (2006)
(explaining the different types of guardianship). The terminology varies by state, with
some using the term conservator for guardians of the estate or plenary guardians. The
alternative of limited guardianship has unfortunately not been popular among judges.
See Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of Limited
Guardianship, 31 STETSON L. REV. 735, 752 (2002).
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include a rebuttable list of preferred guardians, similar in
structure to the lists used to determine statutory surrogates.37
B.

Three Illustrative Areas

This part examines the three illustrative examples of
personal delegations law—divorce, willmaking, and health
care. Each has its own claim to being personal, but delegations
in these areas are currently treated quite differently, with
decisions being readily delegable for health care but much more
controversial for willmaking and divorce.
1. Divorce
Marriage is a fundamental social and, more recently,
legal relation.38 Therefore, the decisions to enter into marriage
or exit from it through divorce implicate the fundamental
human capabilities associated with affiliation.39 As social
beings, we make a variety of choices about who to affiliate with
(or who to cease affiliating with), and our identities are
generated in part through these affiliations. The marital
relation is not the only important type of personal affiliation,
but it is perhaps the most prominent.
While the Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental
right to marry,40 it has never explicitly recognized a fundamental
37

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5311(B) (2012) (using a hierarchical
list); but see ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-204 (2012) (employing a more holistic analysis).
Courts typically inquire into who might be best to serve and prefer to appoint family
members. See MARY JOY QUINN, GUARDIANSHIPS OF ADULTS: ACHIEVING JUSTICE,
AUTONOMY, AND SAFETY 73 (2005) (noting that nearly 70 percent of guardians are
family members, with adult daughters most likely to fill the role). If no family member
is willing or able to serve, or if there is bad blood between family members, then the
court may appoint a professional guardian or public guardian. See Pamela B. Teaster,
Erica F. Wood, Susan A. Lawrence & Winsor C. Schmidt, Wards of the State: A
National Study of Public Guardianship, 37 STETSON L. REV. 193, 240-41 (2007); Alison
Barnes, The Virtues of Corporate and Professional Guardians, 31 STETSON L. REV. 941,
945-46 (2002). Professional guardians are typically subject to certification or screening
requirements to ensure quality services. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.1083 (West
2009) (requiring credit and criminal background checks); TEX PROB. CODE § 697 (West
2009) (requiring letters of reference and professional certification).
38
See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1765-66 (2005).
39
See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 77 (“7. Affiliation. A. Being
able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human
beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; . . . . (Protecting this capability
means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of
affiliation . . . .)”).
40
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (characterizing marriage as
“fundamental to our very existence and survival”).
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right to divorce.41 Regardless of its constitutional status,
however, when considered in the context of guardian decisionmaking, courts have been quick to paint the right as personal,
deeming it nondelegable. The cases in which this issue appears
share similar fact patterns: guardians file for divorce on behalf
of their wards and allege wrongdoing on the part of the spouse
with capacity.42 These cases arise because states do not spell
out the delegability of personal decisions, such as divorce, in
their guardianship statutes.43 This lack of guidance leaves it to
the courts to determine whether the right to divorce should be
implied in the general grants of authority that are given to
guardians. The majority rule is that a guardian may not

41

See Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex
Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1673 n.23 (2011). Courts,
however, have sometimes assumed that it is implied in the right to marry, as have
legal scholars. See, e.g., Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 904 (3d Cir. 1982); J.
Harvie Wilkinson & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 574-75 (1977).
42
See, e.g., Bradford v. Abend, 89 Ill. 78, 78-79 (1878) (wife succumbed to
mental and physical sickness due to “cruelty and neglect” on the part of her husband,
who later abandoned her); Cowan v. Cowan, 1 N.E. 152, 152 (Mass. 1885) (husband
abandoned wife after six weeks and did not contribute to her support, despite being
spotted in adjoining towns). Sometimes, however, it is the wife who is accused of
wrongdoing. See In re Marriage of Drews, 503 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. 1986) (wife
abandoned husband to his parents’ care after he suffered a “severe and disabling head
injury as a consequence of an automobile accident”); Mohler v. Estate of Anthony
Shank, 61 N.W. 981, 982 (Iowa 1895) (wife committed adultery and birthed a “bastard
child,” son of the man she married after Shank’s death). Sometimes there is a financial
consideration, such as the desire to prevent the spouse with capacity from claiming an
interest in marital property. See Cowan, 1 N.E. at 152 (noting an argument in favor of
divorce “that her husband might thus be prevented from interfering with or ultimately
sharing in her [considerable] property” that she “inherited from her father nearly seven
years after the desertion began.”). Other times a financial interest is imputed to the
parties by the court. See In re Jennings, 453 A.2d 572, 574-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1981) (denying the right to divorce by proxy and noting that the case would merely be a
proxy battle over inheritance).
43
When states have specifically codified the power of guardians to divorce
their wards, the answer is clear, and courts have enforced this power. See Vaughan v.
Guardianship of Vaughan, 648 So. 2d 193, 195-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(interpreting FLA. STAT. § 744.3215(4)(c) to allow the initiation of a dissolution action
by a guardian); Garnett v. Garnett, 114 Mass. 379, 379-80 (Mass. 1874) (enforcing
statutory grant of authority to guardian or next friend to pursue divorce action); Denny
v. Denny, 90 Mass. (1 Allen) 311, 313-14 (1864) (same). In other states, there is no clear
statutory codification, but there are relevant provisions in either the guardianship or
divorce statutes that clearly imply such a power. See Houghton v. Keller, 662 N.W.2d
854, 855-56 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (jointly interpreting guardianship and divorce
statutes as permitting suit for divorce by a guardian); Johnson v. Johnson, 811 S.W.2d
822, 825-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (acknowledging the right of the guardian son to pursue
a divorce); but see Brockman v. Young, No. 2010-CA-001354-MR, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 834, at *3-4 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2011) (refusing to read the statute
mentioning the possibility of an incapacitated person prosecuting a divorce action as
implying the right to do so).
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pursue a divorce action.44 In fact, many states accept the
argument that the decision to divorce is “strictly personal” in
nature and thus cannot be delegated to another.45 Some states
44

This rule is exemplified by the case of Worthy v. Worthy, 36 Ga. 45 (1867).
Mary A. Worthy married her husband, Leonard Worthy, in 1858. Id. at 45. By late
1865, she was “insane,” and Leonard sent her to a lunatic’s asylum near Milledgeville
in central Georgia. Id. at 45-46. While she was confined in the asylum, her father,
Nathan Respass, filed for divorce on her behalf, alleging that Leonard had committed
adultery numerous times while she was away. Id. The court refused to see “the right to
sue for a divorce in any other light than as strictly personal to the party aggrieved.” Id.
at 46-47 (emphasis omitted). Even though Mr. Respass’s “feelings and delicacy may
have been outraged,” no one could know if Mary felt the same way. Id. at 47. Further,
the court argued, the law provided a remedy in the form of punishment for adultery,
and “[d]eath only can dissolve the marriage relation without her consent.” Id.
(emphasis omitted).
Many other states have accepted the majority rule. See Cox v. Armstrong,
221 P.2d 371, 373 (Colo. 1950) (recognizing rule); Freeman v. Freeman, 237 S.E.2d 857,
859 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (“The majority rule that a suit for divorce is so personal and
volitional that it cannot be maintained by a guardian on behalf of an incompetent is
sound.”); Murray ex rel. Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1993) (“We adopt
the majority rule in the case of a spouse who is mentally incompetent as to his property
and his person, and hold that he may not bring an action for divorce either on his own
behalf or through a guardian.”); Mills, supra note 20, at 535-37 (2000) (acknowledging
this majority rule but also a minority trend toward allowing such actions). In
determining whether the guardian has such authority, courts are careful to note
whether the guardianship implies a lack of decisional capacity with respect to the
divorce decision, as guardianship over the estate does not necessarily imply the
inability to make a decision about a personal matter like divorce. See In re Marriage of
Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 294-95 (Cal. 1973) (noting that a person under guardianship
may still exercise judgment and the wish to get divorced, which would be instituted
through a guardian ad litem); Schuck v. Myers, 43 Cal. Rptr. 215, (Cal. Ct. App. 1965)
(noting that the appointment of a conservator does not per se create a judgment that
the person is insane or incompetent in a broader sense); In re Marriage of Kutchins,
482 N.E.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (preserving the right of the ward to make
personal decisions, even if under a guardianship of the estate, if the ward is able to
express a desire to dissolve the marriage); Boyd v. Edwards, 446 N.E.2d 1151, 1158
(Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (noting that the mentally ill can still marry even if under
guardianship); State ex rel. Robedeaux v. Johnson, 418 P.2d 337, 340 (Okla. 1966)
(noting that the purposes of a guardianship of the estate is to look after financial
matters, not personal decisions such as divorce); Scoufos v. Fuller, 280 P.2d 720, 724
(Okla. 1954) (comparing the capacity to divorce to testamentary capacity, and
describing how neither is necessarily extinguished by a general finding of
incompetence); Murray, 426 S.E.2d at 784 (preserving the right of the ward to make
personal decisions, even if under a guardianship of the estate, if the ward “is able to
express unequivocally a desire to dissolve the marriage”); Syno v. Syno, 594 A.2d 307,
311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (same).
45
See Iago v. Iago, 48 N.E. 30, 31 (Ill. 1897) (defining the right to divorce as a
personal right that requires intelligent action by the ward); State ex rel. Quear v.
Madison Circuit Court, 229 Ind. 503, 506 (1951) (claiming that the insane cannot
consent to the filing of a complaint); Birdzell v. Birdzell, 33 Kan. 433, 435 (1885)
(noting that marriage is a “a personal status and relation assumed for the joint lives of
the parties” that cannot be dissolved without “free and voluntary consent of the
parties”); Johnson v. Johnson, 170 S.W.2d 889, 889 (Ky. 1943) (concluding that divorce
is “so strictly personal and volitional” that it cannot be maintained, even if this leaves
wards as un-divorceable); In re Babushkin, 29 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163-64 (Sup. Ct. 1941)
(putting the decision to divorce “wholly at the volition” of the ward); Freeman, 237
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have analogized the guardian–ward relationship to the parentchild relationship, noting that, in that context, parents have no
power to divorce on their child’s behalf.46 Others have
acknowledged a public policy of safeguarding marriage, which
they interpret as continuing marriage in light of the possible
threats of divorce.47
The minority trend is to allow guardians to divorce their
wards,48 although the rationales in support of this rule vary.
Some courts compare the decision to divorce to other decisions
that are already deemed delegable49 or treat divorce like any
other civil action.50 Alternatively, other courts focus on the
ward’s experience, proclaiming a judicial duty to protect the
ward from abuse51 or taking note of evidence of the incapacitated
S.E.2d at 859; Shenk v. Shenk, 135 N.E.2d 436, 438 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (noting that a
guardian cannot know “the real will and decision” of a ward, as that is “personal”).
46
See Phillips v. Phillips, 45 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Ga. 1947) (“While under our
statutes the power of such a guardian over the person of his ward is the same as that of
a father over his child, yet even a father cannot make decisions for his child as to
questions of marriage and divorce.”); Mohler v. Estate of Shank, 61 N.W. 981, 983
(Iowa 1895) (“No guardian or parent or next friend can, by any means known to the
law, effectuate a marriage between his ward or child and another . . . . And it appears
to us that a guardian of an insane person has no more right to maintain an action to
dissolve the marriage relation of his ward than he has to manage and control his will in
the matter of entering into the relation.”).
47
See Mohrmann v. Kob, 51 N.E.2d 921, 923-24 (N.Y. 1943) (“The State has a
vital interest in the preservation of the marriage status—an interest which the Legislature
has guarded jealously by the enactment of those statutes which govern divorce.”).
48
The case of Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba presents such a scenario. 850 P.2d 674
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). Peggy and Francisco Ruvalcaba were married in 1979 and had a
child in 1984. Id. at 676. In 1989, Peggy suffered a traumatic head injury after falling
off of a horse. Id. She was in a coma for several months, and when she emerged from it,
she had several cognitive difficulties, which led to the appointment of her mother,
Betty Stubblefield, as her guardian. Id. Betty filed a petition for divorce as well as a
restraining order against Francisco, alleging that he had physically abused Peggy on
several occasions, had threatened Betty, and had said that he would abscond to Mexico
with their child if Betty filed for divorce on behalf of Peggy. Id. at 676-77. The trial
court dismissed the petition, but the appeals court reversed. Id. at 677. In its opinion,
the court noted the breadth of guardian powers, compared the divorce action to medical
decision-making (noting that the latter was delegable), and warned of the possibilities
of abuse if the divorce decision were not delegable. Id. at 683-84.
49
See Karbin v. Karbin, 977 N.E.2d 154, 157-58, 162 (Ill. 2012) (“With the
concept of ‘injury’ removed from divorce in Illinois, it is difficult for us to accept the
view that the decision to divorce is qualitatively different from any other deeply
personal decision, such as the decision to refuse life-support treatment or the decision
to undergo involuntary sterilization.”).
50
See Luster v. Luster, 17 A.3d 1068, 1078-79 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011); In re
Marriage of Ballard & Ballard, 762 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing
divorce through a guardian ad litem); Wahlenmaier v. Wahlenmaier, 762 S.W.2d 575,
575 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam) (same); In re Marriage of Gannon, 702 P.2d 465, 467
(Wash. 1985).
51
See Campbell v. Campbell, 5 So. 2d 401, 402 (Ala. 1941) (“The court has
ample power to protect the interest of the incompetent complainant, and the equity of
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person’s desire for divorce prior to incapacity.52 Regardless of the
rationale employed, the trend toward delegability is likely part
of a more general trend toward no-fault divorce.53 The
presumption that marriage would continue indefinitely, even
possibly in the presence of extensive abuse, was given force
through several legal barriers to initiating and succeeding in a
divorce action.54 But with the institution of no-fault divorce in
all fifty states in 2010,55 one generally need not have a reason for
divorcing and may do so under one of the catchall grounds such as
irreconcilable differences or irremediable breakdown.56 This trend
has served to remove the fault system as a barrier to divorce in
general, with likely spillover effects into guardian divorce.
2. Wills
The will is an instrument that serves multiple functions.
It disposes of property,57 expresses the testator’s wishes,58 and
the bill must be determined on its averments, independent of the state of the
complainant’s mind as if he were suing of his own volition.”); Kronberg v. Kronberg,
623 A.2d 806, 810 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993); McRae v. McRae, 250 N.Y.S.2d 778,
780-81 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (“It cannot be presumed that the Legislature intended to leave
an insane spouse completely at the mercy of the other party to the marriage contract,
who might then with impunity disregard marital obligations or successfully assert
marital rights lost by misconduct.”); Carver Estate, 5 Pa. D. & C.3d 743, 754-55 (C.P.,
Orphans’ Ct. Div. 1977) (noting that access to the courts to procure or apply for divorce
is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause).
52
See Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 339, 341 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)
(recognizing the ward’s desire to end her marriage prior to incapacity as a factor in
finding there is “no public policy or equitable justification for barring the ward’s
guardian from bringing an action for divorce on behalf of the ward”).
53
The recent case of Karbin v. Karbin explicitly employs this logic, noting
that its previous rule barring guardian divorce took root in Illinois in the earlier case of
In re Marriage of Drews, which was governed by the fault regime. See Karbin, 977
N.E.2d at 162 (noting how the policy objectives of the divorce regime as a whole had
changed).
54
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 687, 702 (1994) (“Traditional marriage, supported by a legal rule
that allowed divorce only for grievous offense, was a relationship that involved a
lifelong commitment between spouses and a status with legal attributes independent of
the parties’ preferences.”) (footnote omitted). For instance, some demonstration of fault,
such as abandonment, cruelty, or adultery, on behalf of one of the parties was necessary.
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 1373, 1387-88 (2000). In addition, there were several defenses to divorce claims,
such as condonation or recrimination. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language:
Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1508 (2000).
55
See Joslin, supra note 41, at 1676 n.41, 1704. New York passed no-fault
divorce in 2010. 2010 N.Y. Laws ch. 384, § 1 (Aug. 13, 2010); see also Paterson Signs
No-Fault Divorce Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at A14.
56
See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 188-89 (1989).
57
The Supreme Court has indicated that disposal of property after death
implicates one of the fundamental sticks in the bundle of property rights—to pass on
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represents the final statement of the testator’s social
relationships.59 The act of making a will is thus a personal
decision because it relates to multiple fundamental human
capabilities, including the capabilities to have control over
one’s property, expression, and affiliation.60
Courts and legislatures have generally designated
willmaking as nondelegable, viewing that decision as too
personal to be made by another.61 Before 1998, the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC) permitted delegations of almost every
financial decision-making task to guardians, with the exception
of willmaking.62 Various states incorporated this language into
one’s bounty to those one deems worthy. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987)
(“In one form or another, the right to pass on property—to one’s family in particular—
has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.”).
58
See David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 61 (2012)
(noting the ways in which wills and trusts are “speech acts”).
59
See Deborah S. Gordon, Reflecting on the Language of Death, 34 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 379, 384 (2011) (arguing that “encouraging a testator to express herself in
her will can strengthen the testator’s connection to her personal identity and her
community, an important step in furthering the ultimate goal of having her property
pass as she intends and desires.”).
60
See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 76-77 (“4. Senses,
Imagination, Thought. . . . Being able to use one’s own mind in ways protected by
guarantees of freedom of expression . . . . 7. Affiliation. A. Being able to live with and
toward others . . . . 10. Control over One’s Environment. . . . B. Material. Being able to
hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal
basis with others[.]”).
61
See, e.g., In re Estate of Nagle, 317 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974)
(“It is an inalienable right of a testator to make a will and, as long as it is not unlawful
and the testator is competent, it is an abuse of discretion to alter his will.”); In re
Estate of Runals, 328 N.Y.S.2d 966, 976 (Sur. Ct. 1972) (noting that “the right to make
a will is personal to a decedent. It is not alienable or descendable. It dies with the
decedent.”). Several wills doctrines hinge on or support this conception of the will as
being a personal right or expression. For example, every will must be personally signed
by the testator. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 (2003) (“A will is validly executed if it is in writing and is signed by
the testator and by a specified number of attesting witnesses under procedures
provided by applicable law.”). Many states also recognize the validity of holographic
wills, or wills executed without attestation of witnesses, so long as they are in the
testator’s personal handwriting. See id. § 3.2 (“Statutes in many states provide that a
will, though unwitnessed, is validly executed if it is written in the testator’s
handwriting and signed by the testator, and, under some statutes, dated in the
testator’s handwriting.”). Finally, the doctrine of undue influence also supports this
personal understanding of willmaking, since it requires a showing that the will or
volition of the testator was overcome in order to succeed. See, e.g., Caudill v. Smith, 450
S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (“To prove undue influence in the execution of a
document, a party must show that something operated upon the mind of the person
allegedly unduly influenced which had a controlling effect sufficient to destroy the
person’s free agency and to render the instrument not properly an expression of the
person’s wishes, but rather the expression of the wishes of another or others.”);
Schmidt v. Schwear, 424 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (same).
62
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-407(b)(3) (2010) (“[T]he Court, for the benefit of
the person and members of the person’s immediate family, has all the powers over the
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their statutes.63 In 1998, the UPC was revised to enable
conservators to write or modify the will of a ward with court
approval,64 but only five states have enacted reforms in line with
the most recent version of the UPC.65 Thus, the domain of wills
prohibits personal delegations, even though the right concerned
is primarily statutory rather than constitutional in nature.66
The general nondelegation rule with respect to
willmaking is not only curious when compared to health care,67
but it is also inconsistent within the field of trusts and estates
more generally. Individuals can already delegate decisionmaking over the financial aspects of willmaking through a
variety of mechanisms, including durable powers of attorney,68
powers of appointment,69 and various other nonprobate
mechanisms, such as joint bank accounts, pension accounts with
designated beneficiaries, and trusts.70 And, as noted earlier, a
guardian of the estate has the ability to manipulate the ward’s
assets in various ways during life, which likely has a more
profound impact on the ward’s well-being than the additional
power to dispose of assets at death.
It seems surprising, then, that the willmaking power is
nondelegable in most states. One possible explanation is that
courts wish to safeguard the expressive function of wills, since
the financial aspects are already delegable by other means.
This, however, does not cure the inconsistency. First, much
estate planning in practice is done through the use of form
wills and other instruments, which has reduced the importance

estate and business affairs which the person could exercise if present and not under
disability, except the power to make a will.”).
63
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5407(2)(c) (West 2010); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:12-49 (West 2006); Brashier, supra note 28, at 83-85 n.72 (compiling statutes).
64
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a)(7) (2010).
65
See Brashier, supra note 28, at 69 n.23. Other states only allow delegation
of the power to modify a will for certain narrow tax purposes. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/11a-18 (West 2007) (allowing a delegation for general tax purposes); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 744.441(18) (West 2011) (allowing a delegation only in the case of an estate tax
charitable deduction).
66
See United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 627 (1896) (noting that the
right to dispose of property by will is within legislative control).
67
See infra Part I.B.3.
68
See infra Part III.A.
69
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 17.1(c) (2003) (“[A] power of appointment
traditionally confers the authority to designate recipients of beneficial ownership interests in or
powers of appointment over property that the donee does not own.”).
70
See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the
Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984).
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of the testator’s voice in the construction of wills.71 More
importantly, trustmaking can be an equally expressive endeavor,
yet it remains readily delegable.72
While the trend is toward making various aspects of
willmaking delegable, the historical rule has been one of
prohibition, which seems odd in light of estate planning’s
overall shift toward delegability of financial decision-making.
3. Health Care
Health-care decisions facilitate good health and improve
life expectancy. As discrete decisions, they have perhaps the
most direct impact on the fundamental capabilities of life and
bodily health.73 In the American jurisprudential scheme,
decisions about bodily integrity, which include health-care
decisions, are considered to lie at the root of personal
autonomy.74 In constitutional law, several theories support this

71

Some commentators have argued that willmaking should become even
more standardized. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals
Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 920-37 (2012) (arguing for the attachment of a
“testamentary schedule” to tax returns as a way of promoting willmaking and avoiding
intestacy). Others have urged the opposite. See Gordon, supra note 59, at 383-84.
72
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts specifically notes how a general policy of
prohibition of delegations could indeed apply to trusts as well:
[T]he will-making prohibition may instead manifest a more general,
substantive policy against post-death dispositions by these fiduciaries that
would alter the plan of disposition established by intestate succession or by
an existing will executed by a person who has subsequently become
incompetent.
The breadth and generality of the latter policy would ordinarily apply by
analogy to limit the post-death distributive provisions of a revocable inter
vivos trust created by a legal representative or agent to dispositions that
conform to the disposition of the affected property that would result, as the
case may be, by operation of law or under the incompetent person’s existing
estate plan.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 cmt. f (2003) (citation omitted). The
Restatement diffuses the difficulty by concluding that a narrower policy, based on
“efficiency and tradition,” justifies the proxy willmaking prohibition, though it is
unclear what efficiencies result from authorizing guardians to make dispositions
through will substitutes but not by will.
73
See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 76 (“1. Life. Being able to live
to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is
so reduced as to be not worth living. 2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health,
including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.”).
74
See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”).
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understanding, including a positive right to privacy,75 a
protected liberty interest,76 and a dignitary interest in being
free from governmental intrusion into one’s body.77 Informed
consent in medical tort law is also based on the idea that
patients possess the ultimate right of decision with regard to
questions of bodily integrity.78
Given the sacrosanct nature of these decisions, it is
somewhat surprising that the large majority of them are also
readily delegable. In fact, because most states have enacted
statutory surrogacy laws, health-care decision-makers need not
go through the cumbersome guardianship process to acquire
decision-making authority.79 If there is a serious dispute
between family members, the issue might end up in court; but
generally, these proxy decisions are not subject to judicial
approval or oversight. Instead, they are constrained by the
medical profession’s standard of care and code of ethics.80 As a
result, the whole decision-making process is taken outside the
realm of the law and instead is relocated in the physicianfamily relationship.81
75

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (recognizing a sphere of
personal privacy that protected a variety of autonomous decisions); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (protecting a right to the use of contraception, regardless of
marital status).
76
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(recognizing a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the refusal of medical treatment).
77
See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that
forcibly pumping a suspect’s stomach for evidence “shocks the conscience” and violates
his right to privacy).
78
See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”), abrogated by Bing v.
Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
79
Prior to the passage of such laws, physicians relied informally on family
decision-makers without involvement of the law or the courts. See LAWRENCE A.
FROLIK, THE LAW OF LATER-LIFE HEALTH CARE AND DECISION MAKING 219-21 (2006)
(“The natural and customary reliance upon next of kin to make medical decisions for
the mentally incapacitated is so deeply ingrained that it is rarely challenged.”).
80
See, e.g., Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24, 49 (Ky. 2004)
(“[J]udicial intervention into private decision-making of this sort is expensive and
intrusive. It is both impossibly cumbersome and a gratuitous encroachment upon the
medical profession’s field of competence. Thus, unless the interested parties disagree,
resort to the courts is unwarranted.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted));
John A. Robertson, Schiavo and Its (In)Significance, 35 STETSON L. REV. 101, 106-07
(2005) (“The few disputes that have percolated up to the courts have been of two types.
One type has involved cases in which doctors or hospitals refused to follow advance
directives or proxy requests for or against treatment. The second type, of which Schiavo is
an example, involves disputes between family members over a course of action.”).
81
See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
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While most health-care decisions fall within the scheme
outlined above, some decisions are regulated more closely.
These decisions arise in areas where the state has a perceived
interest to protect, such as the preservation of life.82 For
example, many states require guardians to demonstrate the
previous wishes of the ward by clear and convincing evidence, a
higher evidentiary standard, before permitting them to make a
decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.83 The Supreme
Court has ratified such evidentiary hurdles, rejecting arguments
that they represent unconstitutional infringements on the ward’s
right to refuse medical treatment through their guardians.84
Another example arises in the area of transplantation of a ward’s
organs for the benefit of a third party, which typically requires
judicial approval.85
Thus, health-care decisions—those at the root of
multiple fundamental capabilities—are readily delegable to
others, oftentimes without judicial intervention or oversight.
***
The law has developed several mechanisms for dealing
with the delegation of decision-making when incapacity strikes,
but it has limited the use of these mechanisms for certain
classes of decisions. While this part was primarily descriptive in
exploring the mechanisms and how they are employed

SUSTAINING TREATMENT 128 (1983), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/
pcbe/reports/past_commissions/deciding_to_forego_tx.pdf (offering five reasons for deferring
to the family). If a ward has gone through the guardianship process and has a guardian,
then the guardian will be in the same role as the statutory surrogate. See id. at 128-30.
82
See John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of
Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1140-41 (1991)
(discussing the policy of “vitalism”).
83
See Alicia Ouellette, When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination
Against and Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment,
79 IND. L.J. 1, 48-55 (2004) (compiling statutes).
84
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284-85 (1990).
85
See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 145 (Ky. 1969) (authorizing
transplant of kidney to brother based on a best interests standard and justifying it by
noting the relationship the incapacitated person had with his brother); In re Doe, 481
N.Y.S.2d 932, 932 (App. Div. 1984) (authorizing bone marrow donation as the record
had demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that it was in the ward’s best
interests); In re Pescinski, 266 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis. 1975) (not authorizing kidney
transplant to sister, finding that the ward had not consented and that the transplant
was not in the ward’s best interests). For analysis of these types of cases, see generally
Michael T. Morley, Note, Proxy Consent to Organ Donation by Incompetents, 111 YALE
L.J. 1215 (2002); John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the
Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 48 (1976).

2013]

PERSONAL DELEGATIONS

1249

inconsistently in three particular domains, the next part examines
the normative arguments justifying access to these mechanisms.
II.

DELEGATION RATIONALES

This part examines the rationales for delegation of
personal decision-making authority. First, it examines how the
capabilities approach applies to the cognitive-impairment
context, arguing that it requires equal access to personal
decisions for those lacking decisional capacity. This, in turn,
requires that they be able to make the decisions through a
surrogate. This part then considers alternative normative
arguments for delegation that derive from the legal standards
governing the decision-making of surrogates: the substituted
judgment and best interests approaches. Finally, this part
examines the rationale courts use to justify a nondelegation
rule—that certain decisions are too personal to be delegated to
another—concluding that it is unavailing.
A.

Capability, Dignity, and Disability

The capabilities approach posits that a life worthy of
human dignity is one in which a person has the capability to
achieve certain functionings that society considers central to
the human experience. These functionings might embrace the
ability to do certain things (for example, to worship the faith of
one’s choice) or the ability to achieve certain states of being (for
example, having good health).86 A given person’s capabilities
are a “product of her internal endowments, her external
resources, and the social and physical environment in which
she lives.”87 Thus, in order to respect the inherent worth of
individuals, a just society must provide the means through
which individuals can exercise their capabilities. This can be
accomplished by developing the internal endowments an
individual possesses, altering the external resources afforded to
her, restructuring the physical or social environment in which
she lives, or allowing access to decisions that inhere in those

86

See NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 21, at 86-96.
See Elizabeth Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice, in
MEASURING JUSTICE: PRIMARY GOODS AND CAPABILITIES 96 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid
Robeyns eds., 2010).
87
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fundamental capabilities.88 These steps ensure that individuals
flourish and lead lives worthy of human dignity.89
For certain types of capabilities, this simply means that
society must provide them at an adequate level. For example,
while a just society may require that individuals have access to
adequate shelter, that society need not ensure that each
citizen’s housing be equal in size or quality.90 But for other types
of capabilities, the only way to ensure their adequacy is to
ensure that they are provided on an equal basis. For example,
political, religious, or civil liberties must be provided equally in
order to be provided adequately.91 Moreover, personal decisions
fall in the same category—individuals must have equal access to
them in order for their provision to be adequate.92
All citizens belonging to the human community are
entitled to achieve these capabilities, and those with cognitive
impairment should not be excluded from this human community
simply because they lack the capacity to engage in certain forms
of practical reasoning.93 While rationality may be what
separates us from some other animals in a descriptive sense, it
is not the sole defining feature of a life worthy of human

88

Decision-making is built in to the capabilities approach, as personal
decisions must be available to allow one to achieve certain functionings. Not all
decision-making is per se fundamental though—it needs to be connected to some other
fundamental capability to achieve that status and to be subject to the analysis of this
article. For example, it would be difficult to characterize the decision to use a plate or a
bowl to eat a routine meal as connected to some fundamental human capability. Thus,
it is not a personal decision, and would not be subject to the same analysis.
89
See id.
90
Martha Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities,
in COGNITIVE DISABILITIES AND ITS CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 79-80 (Eva
Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson eds., 2010).
91
Id.; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109
ETHICS 287, 312-15 (1999) (arguing for a democratic conception of equality that justifies
this understanding of adequacy as meaning equality in this instance).
92
Nussbaum, supra note 90, at 79-80. As noted in Part I, personal decisions
are defined in terms of the relevant normative theory. Here, it is the capabilities
approach, so personal decisions are defined as those that are implicated in
fundamental human capabilities. Equal access can, of course, come in different forms
(e.g. making a personal decision oneself versus relying on a surrogate to assist in
making a personal decision), so long as access is achieved in a meaningful way.
93
While psychologically this may impact our perceptions of people with
cognitive impairment as persons in some moral sense, this should not necessarily
control the moral value we attribute to this population. See generally Heikki Ikäheimo,
Personhood and the Social Inclusion of People with Disabilities: A RecognitionTheoretical Approach, in ARGUING ABOUT DISABILITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
77-92 (Kristjana Kristiansen et al. eds., 2009) (examining how our recognition of people
with disabilities as persons informs our judgments of personhood).
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dignity.94 Indeed, our humanity is also defined by, among other
things, our capabilities to live in good health, experience things
with our senses, form social attachments, and enjoy recreational
activities. Only if an individual’s capacity to exercise a
significant cluster of these capabilities were cut off—for
instance, in the case of someone in a permanent coma or
persistent vegetative state—might we think that a person had
perhaps stopped being part of the human community.95
Some might note that the loss of decisional capacity, a
biological and perhaps unchangeable fact, causes the lack of
capabilities. But a deeper analysis would see it as a
combination of both the loss of capacity and the imposition of
barriers that prevent guardians or other surrogates from
making these types of decisions on behalf of their wards. These
barriers, which manifest themselves in the form of nondelegation
doctrines, serve to disempower those who lack decisional capacity,
cutting them off from the capabilities to achieve functionings
consistent with a life worthy of human dignity. As a symbolic
matter, this is disconcerting because it sends the message that
those with cognitive impairment are not worthy of the capabilities
that inhere in the concept of human dignity. As a practical
matter, it is troubling because those with cognitive impairment
may still have preferences or interests that could be expressed
through such surrogate decision-making.
The reality for those living with cognitive impairment is
that they must have access to someone who can assist them or
act in their stead in order to realize equal access to personal
decisions. For those who lack decisional capacity but can still
communicate some form of preference, the task of the surrogate
decision-maker or guardian is to elicit those preferences and
transform them into a decision. For those who cannot even
communicate any form of preference, the surrogate must be able
to stand in for them, following a ward’s preexisting life plan or
making the decisions based on the ward’s present best interests.96
It might at first seem strange to suggest that having a
surrogate assist in making decisions for a cognitively impaired
94

See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 179-95. This is not to
downplay the importance of practical reason in facilitating the other fundamental
human capabilities. It is, in fact, central. Being able to form one’s conception of the
good life and plan one’s life accordingly is what gives much of the content to the
personal decisions that are actualizations of the various fundamental capabilities.
95
See id. In these cases, we might still support delegation of certain types of
decisions for other reasons, but the rationale would need to come from some other theory.
96
See Nussbaum, supra note 90, at 79-80.
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person actually realizes that person’s capabilities. Personal
assistants and assistive technologies, however, do not signal
dependency or inauthentic autonomy. The disability rights
movement has long argued that assistance is a form of
empowerment and a guarantee of control over one’s life and
environment.97 Feminist analyses of dependency also clarify the
difference between “socially necessary dependence” and “surplus
dependence.” The former is an “inescapable feature of the
human condition,” while the latter is “rooted in unjust and
potentially remediable social institutions.”98 Declines in
cognitive abilities may be inescapable for many individuals as
they age, but being disempowered by those cognitive deficits is,
in fact, an unjust and remediable social institution.
This principle is best illustrated by an analogy to
mobility impairments. A person without functioning legs lacks
the capacity to travel freely from place to place without
assistance; however, it would be incorrect to view this solely as
the product of the physical impairment.99 It may also be the
product of the lack of resources to purchase a wheelchair or the
absence of a physical environment designed to enable access to
streets and buildings with said wheelchair. If society were to
provide the person with mobility impairments a wheelchair
and an accessible environment, it could not then be said that
that person is not truly experiencing movement or travel.
Clearly, it is a different experience, but that person is still
experiencing movement and travel, despite the fact that it is
facilitated through alternative mechanisms that most people
need not use.
Similarly, society should allow those with cognitive
impairments to plan ahead and select surrogates who will act
97

See, e.g., Alan Roulstone, Researching a Disabling Society: The Case of
Employment and New Technology, in THE DISABILITY READER: SOCIAL SCIENCE
PERSPECTIVES 110-28 (Tom Shakespeare ed., 1998) (describing the role and importance
of assistive technology in the employment context); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 9991000 (2003) (describing the philosophy of the independent living movement). The
experiences of those with physical and mental impairments are not entirely parallel,
however. Another crucial component of the independent living philosophy is the idea of
consumer control over personal assistants, which may not be realizable to the same
degree for people with cognitive impairments. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of
Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 75-81 (2004) (describing the role of consumer control).
98
See Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, “Dependency” Demystified: Inscriptions
of Power in a Keyword of the Welfare State, 1 SOC. POL. 4-31 (1994).
99
This is an area where the capabilities approach converges with and
complements the social model of disability. See generally MICHAEL OLIVER, THE
POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH (1990).
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on their behalf if they lose decisional capacity, and it should
create a set of default mechanisms to govern those who do not
have such foresight. If society provides legal mechanisms to
enable an individual to make personal decisions with the
assistance of a surrogate, this does not mean that that person
is not truly experiencing the capabilities facilitated by such
decision-making. Again, the experience or outcome is certainly
different, and that difference is a necessary byproduct of the
cognitive impairment. But that difference alone, however, is not
sufficient to deprive an individual of an aspect of the human
experience that provides access to many of the other fundamental
human capabilities that she might still be able to enjoy.100
There is a final point to address before moving on. Mere
provision of fundamental capabilities does not mean that one is
required to exercise them to achieve the functionings they
facilitate.101 The same holds true with respect to the personal
decisions that are the subject of this analysis. No one is required
to divorce, make a will, or seek health care in order to lead a life
worthy of human dignity, even if equal access to these
opportunities is part of having the capabilities that we deem
integral to a life worthy of human dignity. Similarly, surrogates
would not be required to make these decisions either, provided
that opting not to do so did not indicate some lack of capability
or breach of fiduciary duty.102 The next subpart examines the
standards for decision-making once a surrogate is empowered
and suggests that other normative arguments for personal
delegations might be derived from them.
B.

Autonomy, Preferences, and Welfare

The capabilities approach requires equal access to
decisions that implicate fundamental human capabilities, both
100

The analogy between physical and cognitive impairments exposes a tension
in the field of disability studies about the role of guardianship as an empowering or
disempowering institution. See Michael Bérubé, Equality, Freedom, and/or Justice for
All: A Response to Martha Nussbaum, in COGNITIVE DISABILITIES AND ITS CHALLENGE
TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 90, at 97, 102-03.
101
See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 171-73. Thus, the argument
from the capabilities approach does not rely on a particular theory of what the content
of surrogate decision-making should be; it merely posits that such surrogate decisionmaking should be allowed to occur.
102
At the same time, as a practical matter we might suspect that capabilities
are not present if there is no exercise of the decisions that inhere in those capabilities.
It may not be the result of choice, but instead of some undeveloped endowment, lack of
material resources, or environmental barriers. See id.
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to recognize the dignity of people with cognitive impairments
and as a matter of social justice.103 There are other justifications
for permitting or opposing personal delegations, which rely on
alternative normative intuitions. This subpart sketches out
some of these justifications by exploring the two legal decisionmaking standards that govern surrogate decision-making:
substituted judgment and best interests. In other words, by
understanding what surrogates should be doing once empowered,
we can better understand why they should be empowered in the
first place. It is important to note that there is a sizable literature
about which decision-making standard to prefer,104 but this article
does not seek to resolve that particular debate. The narrower
task is to tease out the normative intuitions that underlie these
models of surrogate decision-making and examine how they
might apply to the question of personal delegations.
1. Substituted Judgment
When a surrogate decision-maker finds herself
empowered to make decisions, in many states she lacks any
guidance about the legal standards that govern her decisionmaking.105 But for those states that have addressed the issue, the
103

It does not, however, specify a conception of the self over time (pre- and
post-incapacity), nor does it suggest what legal standard of decision-making should
govern a guardian or attorney-in-fact once empowered.
104
See, e.g., BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 26, at 10-12 (taking the middleground on appropriate approach for surrogate decision-making for the incapacitated);
RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 190-96 (1993) (describing the three issues of
autonomy, best interests, and sanctity that run through this type of decision-making);
ROBERT S. OLICK, TAKING ADVANCE DIRECTIVES SERIOUSLY: PROSPECTIVE AUTONOMY
AND DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE xvii (2001) (advocating for prospective
decisional autonomy); Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best
Interests: Toward a Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent
Patients Without Advance Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1193, 1197 (1996) (arguing
for a dignity-based approach); Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy
for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (2003) (arguing for a best
interests approach that addresses the present interests of the ward); Leslie Pickering
Francis, Decisionmaking at the End of Life: Patients with Alzheimer’s or Other
Dementias, 35 GA. L. REV. 539, 540, 591-92 (2001) (arguing for the precedence of
autonomy-based decision-making procedures, so long as they do not result in pain to
the incapacitated ward); Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted
Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 739, 741 (2012); Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die:
Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 857, 888 (1992) (arguing for a best
interests test when the patient did not express a prior preference).
105
See Carolyn Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial Durable Power of
Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574, 587-88 (1996) (calling for clarity on
the attorney-in-fact’s duty to act); Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate
Decision-Making Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV.
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common view is that the surrogate must employ a substituted
judgment standard.106 When a surrogate exercises substituted
judgment, she must mimic, to the extent possible, the decisions
the ward would make if the ward had capacity.107 Originating in
the common law of lunacy, the theory behind this subjective
test is that it safeguards the ward’s autonomy and preserves a
state of the world that the ward would find desirable if she
were to regain capacity.108
Central to this standard is an understanding of the
individual as an autonomous actor with preferences that
survive incapacity. As such, the preferences a person had in the
past should presumptively govern the future incapacitated self
as well.109 When examined in the context of personal decisions
and delegations, carrying these preferences through time takes
on special importance, given that they are heavily involved in
the process of self-definition and reflect certain core
commitments, life plans, or ideals about the good life.
Philosophers have devised many terms to describe these types of

1491, 1495 (2012) (noting that out of fifty-two jurisdictions considered (the fifty states,
Washington D.C., and the Virgin Islands), twenty-eight had no legal standard for
guardian decision-making).
106
See Whitton & Frolik, supra note 105 (noting that eighteen jurisdictions
adhere to a substituted judgment standard, usually in combination with a best
interests standard, while six jurisdictions adhere simply to a best interests standard).
107
See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (Ill. 1990) (“The doctrine of
substituted judgment requires a surrogate decisionmaker to attempt to establish, with
as much accuracy as possible, what decision the patient would make if [the patient]
were competent to do so.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
108
See Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1990). The lunatic was someone who
previously had capacity, but now either lacks it completely or has interludes of lucidity.
The lunatic was contrasted with the “idiot,” who was never competent. Id. at 17-18.
This standard raises evidentiary issues, specifically what is required to establish the
ward’s past preferences. Some states have required public statements of preference on
the specific decision at issue. See, e.g., In re Westchester Cty. Med. Ctr. ex rel.
O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 607 (N.Y. 1988); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67-68 (N.Y.
1981) (involving a Brother of the Society of Mary who had publically declared that he
did not wish life-sustaining treatment during conversations about the case of Karen
Ann Quinlan). Other states have accepted a more holistic analysis, examining the
ward’s religious beliefs or general values. See In re Jobes, 529 N.E.2d 434, 444 (N.J.
1987) (requiring surrogate decision-makers to consult the ward’s “relevant
philosophical, theological, and ethical values”); see also DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d
698, 708-09 (Ky. 1993); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 758 (Md. 1993).
109
See OLICK, supra note 104, at 45-112 (laying out the ethical argument for
prospective decisional autonomy); see also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 11 (1986) (describing harm as a “setback [to] interests”).
This approach rejects the notion that incapacity creates a new self that is disconnected
from a former self that might have inhabited the same body. See OLICK, supra note
104, at 127-51.
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commitments—“critical interests,”110 “second-order desires,”111
“ulterior interests,”112 or simply “projects”113—but the key point
is that they are important to maintaining a sense of self and are
heavily interwoven with identity. Some of these projects might
be interpersonal in nature (for example, devotion to family or
maintenance of important relationships), while others may be
quite unique to the individual (for example, being known for
having a particular quality, such as fashion sense, or for
achieving fame in a particular sport or game, such as online
poker). If we presume that the same person exists before and
after incapacity, then maintaining these life plans after
incapacity is of fundamental importance.
Whereas under the capabilities approach we would
define personal decisions as those that implicate fundamental
capabilities, under a substituted judgment approach we might
define personal decisions as those that are implicated in
especially important commitments that have some identityforming function. Under this approach, delegating decisionmaking authority or maintaining a status quo outcome by
prohibiting personal delegations could both be viewed as ways
of exercising prospective decisional autonomy. Moreover, many
personal decisions taken while a person still has capacity
create a status quo outcome that is likely preferred by the
individual through time. This fact alone, however, is not a
reason to prohibit delegation of personal decisions to a
surrogate.114 First, altering the status quo outcome may be the
110

See DWORKIN, supra note 104, at 201-02 (characterizing critical interests
as fundamental to making sense of one’s existence, and contrasting them with simple
experiential interests).
111
See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,
68 J. PHIL. 5, 6-7 (1971) (“Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this
and that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires or motives.”).
112
See FEINBERG, supra note 109, at 36-45 (describing these as interests that
we value as ends in themselves).
113
See BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 5 (1981) (describing our projects as
those enterprises that shape our character); see also GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 16-20 (1988).
114
For example, one could argue that one might best approximate what most
wards’ preferences are by favoring a status quo outcome, if certain conditions are met.
The argument would be strongest if the status quo outcome would be favored by a large
majority of wards, if circumstances would be relatively stable in that decisional domain
such that the expression of the preference would not run counter to some other higherorder preference of the ward, and if delegation to a surrogate would for some reason
result in a substantial level of abuse, leading to outcomes that a ward would not favor.
It is not clear that these conditions hold strongly in many of the decisional domains
considered here, but the argument can certainly be made for a prohibition of personal
delegations on this basis.
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best way of safeguarding an individual’s life plan if circumstances
change. This is clearest in the case of health care, where changing
health conditions and treatment options might dictate a different
way of honoring a person’s preexisting preferences. Second, the
status quo outcome is not necessarily always reflective of a
decision made by the individual. This is clearest in the case of
voting, where the status quo outcome would represent
nonparticipation in the political system, which may or may not
reflect the individual’s prior political participation.
Thus, if one adheres to the ideas of prospective
decisional autonomy, continuous personal identity, and the
importance of preserving preexisting life plans, then one might
find the rationale behind the substituted judgment standard to
be an attractive reason to permit delegation of at least some
personal decisions.
2. Best Interests
Sometimes it is impossible to know what the ward
would have wanted, either because she did not express a
concrete opinion on a subject or because her other known
values are indeterminate in their application to a specific
factual situation. Alternatively, one might believe that the
ward’s incapacity so alters the self that it has created a new
person, who should not be bound by the ward’s previously
expressed wishes.115 In either case, the guardian must shift to a
best interests test.116 Under this standard, the guardian must
do what is objectively best for the ward.117
The application of the best interests analysis depends
on the measure of welfare one adopts. In the same way, the
definition of a personal decision also varies according to the
normative theory one selects. Under the best interests analysis,
115

For the strongest proponent of this type of view in philosophy, see
generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). For an application of this work
to the law, see Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and NonTreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 L.,
MED., & HEALTH CARE 234, 240-41 (1989) (arguing for a present interests approach).
116
See Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for
Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REV. 386, 407-08 (“In some of the cases where the
substituted judgment standard yields no defensible result, the courts should retreat to
the traditional doctrine of parens patriae and act in the incompetent’s best interests.”).
117
See In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 354 (Ill. 1994) (“Under the ‘best interests’
test, the court is guided by an objective standard of what a reasonable person would
prefer under the circumstances of the particular case.”). This test originates in the law
of child custody. See Harmon, supra note 108, at 30 n.170, 32-33.
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personal decisions would be defined as those likely to affect
welfare, however defined, in substantial ways.118 Subjective
measures of welfare, such as preference satisfaction,119 might be
difficult to implement in the case of decisional incapacity.
Indeed, if a court has determined that a person lacks decisional
capacity, then a judgment exists that the ward’s cognitive
processes governing preference formation or reasoning are
impaired. If an individual can no longer form preferences, then
it is not clear that preference satisfaction functions well as a
measure of welfare in this context. On the other hand, if an
individual can still formulate preferences that should be
honored but needs assistance converting those preferences into
a set of decisions or a coherent life plan, then a guardian or
attorney-in-fact may be best positioned to assist in doing so.
This suggests that personal delegations should be permitted to
allow this process to take place.120
The best interests of the ward could also be measured
according to some objective criteria, such as whether a given
decision reflects the preferences of a reasonable person in the
ward’s circumstances or promotes certain virtues.121 If the
objective criteria in question are easily connected to a status
quo outcome, then a bar on personal delegations (to maintain
said status quo outcome) would be preferable to individualized
decision-making by a surrogate. For example, if one believed
that the continuation of life through the use of feeding tubes
represented a positive outcome for the individual and society in
most instances, or if a consensus existed in society that this was
the case, then a default rule requiring that outcome would be
superior to personal delegations that might allow a surrogate to
deviate from that outcome. But absent an argument for this
outcome or a societal consensus on the topic, it is not clear that
118

Again, the definition of personal decisions in the best interests approach
will overlap significantly with other normative approaches, though it of course depends
on the theory of welfare one selects.
119
See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 28-35 (2006) (discussing this welfarist approach).
120
Some scholars have revived the classic hedonic conception of subjective
welfare. See generally John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583,
1593-1600 (2010). Applying this formulation of welfare to the case of decisional
incapacity raises a host of empirical questions. So long as a person lacking decisional
capacity is capable of experiencing pleasure or pain, we would need to know whether
allowing personal delegations would increase or decrease aggregate happiness
measured at moments in time, including those moments that occur post-incapacity. Id.
121
See generally PHILLIPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS (2001) (promoting such
a virtue ethics approach); Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65
(2006) (applying this approach to judging and justice more generally).
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barring personal delegations would lead to fulfillment of the
ward’s best interests in a given decisional domain. The rise of
personalized default rules may make it possible to tailor status
quo outcomes to particular populations, but these rules are still
in their infancy, and it is not clear that they would apply to
personal decisions as well as they apply to financial ones.122
The normative intuitions underlying the substituted
judgment and best interests standards of decision-making help
us understand alternative rationales for personal delegations.
Having briefly considered them, the next subpart critiques the
primary argument courts use to justify a nondelegation rule for
personal decision-making authority, namely that some
decisions are too personal to delegate to another.
C.

The Personal in Personal Decisions

Having examined the case for delegating personal
decisions, I turn now to potential objections. These objections
derive from courts’ justifications of nondelegation rules—
specifically, the classification of a decision as personal. The
Luster court suggested two possible rationales underlying the
concept of the personal that justify a nondelegation rule, and
these are echoed throughout the case law.123 The first refers to
personal preferences that are idiosyncratic, such as certain
tastes.124 Some people abhor bitter drinks, while others find
them to be a refreshing palate cleanser. These preferences are
not easily predictable, even if they are occasionally expressed
publicly. In fact, the reasons for these preferences, whatever
they may be, may have comprehensible meaning only to the
original decision-maker, if at all.

122

See Cass R. Sunstein, Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs.
Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych, 1, 4-5 (Nov. 5, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171343 (discussing the tradeoffs
between different types of default rules (societal or personalized) and active choices and
exploring the points at which it might make sense to favor one strategy over another).
123
See supra Part I.B.
124
See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics
Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2122-23 (1996) (discussing how unstable preferences can
complicate otherwise straightforward law and economics analyses); Mark Kelman, Law
and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1347, 1363 (2003)
(“[T]he idea that we can speak intelligibly about developing institutions that effectively
respond to ‘tastes’ depends on the notion that there are stable tastes to respond to,
rather than on the notion that there are far more shifting, unstable preferences that
appear or disappear, depending upon how we elicit them.”).
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The second is that the preferences underlying personal
decisions may be particularly private or unrevealed to others.125
Part of this rationale stems from the fact that personal
decisions occur in private and thus cannot be observed by
others. For example, most people have sex only in the presence
of their sexual partners. Without knowing what particular
decision was made in the privacy of the home, it is difficult for
others to theorize about the preferences underlying the
decision. Moreover, if the decision occurs only rarely, then the
possibility of observation will be even more difficult. For
example, many people do not repeatedly divorce or make
decisions about their own end-of-life health care, meaning that
opportunities to observe the decision before incapacity strikes
may be very limited. Finally, even if the decision is observed,
unless the ward has explained her reasoning behind the
decision, it may not be possible to decipher her underlying
preferences and how they might apply to a novel situation.126
In short, both of these characterizations of personal
preferences point to the same conclusion: a surrogate decisionmaker is likely to get the decision wrong because the ward’s
preferences are unpredictable or unknowable. Even if these
accounts have merit, they are not an indictment of personal
delegations per se but rather of the application of the
substituted judgment standard for surrogate decision-making
in personal domains. If there were no other workable decisionmaking standard, then a simple nondelegation rule might be
prudent. But that is not the case. The best interests standard
can guide surrogate decision-making in the place of the
substituted judgment standard, and it has proven at least
workable in the context of children.127
125

See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1488 n.46 (1998) (noting how
economists consider preferences “revealed” when choices are made); Bailey Kuklin, The
Gaps Between the Fingers of the Invisible Hand, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 835, 853-55 (1992)
(noting the difficulties that economics have in predicting preferences that are unstable or
unrevealed); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 932
(1996) (noting how economists consider preferences “revealed” when choices are made).
126
Various types of personal preferences may not even be operative in the
situation of incapacity. If a ward previously bought and read books on her iPad, and
now does not have the ability to process such text, it would not make sense to continue
buying books and giving her an iPad to play with. The preference has no meaning in
the new context.
127
See Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1221, 1242-43 (2011); but see Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best
Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1987). There is some literature
developing what might constitute “best interests” for a person lacking decisional capacity.
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Thus, there needs to be some additional argument why
personal delegations are inherently invalid. One might argue
that prohibiting personal delegations serves a useful function
in protecting personhood, as personal delegations may violate
the inalienable nature of personal decisions.128 Those favoring
inalienability of certain goods claim that making them
alienable through a market mechanism constitutes a type of
violence to personhood that inhibits human flourishing.129
Proponents argue that if certain goods are even partially
transformed into commodities, market rhetoric will
inappropriately come to dominate our understanding of them.130
But is delegation of personal decisions subject to the same sort
of argument? Perhaps certain decisions are so intimately
associated with personal identity or a person’s social
relationships that allowing those decisions to be made by
another would do violence to personhood or human flourishing.
In the context of marriage, many individuals view their
See Bruce Jennings, Agency and Moral Relationship in Dementia, in COGNITIVE
DISABILITIES AND ITS CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 90, at 171.
128
Delegation of personal decisions deems the right of decision over personal
matters alienable. See Donald Van de Veer, Are Human Rights Alienable?, 37 PHIL.
STUD. 165, 168 (1980) (“[S]o long as A by some act or omission ceases to have a right
formerly possessed, whether or not that right is acquired by another, A alienates that
right. So, if a right is transferable, waivable, or forfeitable, the right is alienable.”).
This type of argument is familiar in property law and acts as a justification for
prohibiting the transfer of body parts for monetary gain. The classic take on
inalienability rules in the law comes from Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972) (“[R]ules of inalienability not only ‘protect’ the
entitlement; they may also be viewed as limiting or regulating the grant of the
entitlement itself.”). Inalienability rules can take many forms. See Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1852-55 (1987) (noting that
separation from the self is the key to the concept of inalienability, and differentiating
nonforfeitability, nonwaivability, nongivability, nonsalability, and nontransferability);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 931, 933-37 (1985) (recognizing three dimensions to property rights—who may
hold the entitlement, what actions must be taken or not taken to maintain the
entitlement, and what kinds of transfers are permitted).
129
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 88 (1996)
(“Systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is threatening to
personhood because it detaches from the person that which is integral to the person.”).
Radin admits that “[t]here is no algorithm or abstract formula to tell us which items
are (justifiably) personal. A moral judgment is required in each case.” Radin, supra
note 128, at 1908. For a contrary view, see Richard A. Epstein, The Human and
Economic Dimensions of Altruism: The Case of Organ Transplantation, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. 459 (2008) (arguing for a market in kidneys).
130
To demonstrate how this might be the case, Radin uses the example of how
some theorists of law and economics try to understand prohibitions on rape in terms of
market logic. RADIN, supra note 129, at 87 (“[F]or all but the deepest enthusiast [of law
and economics], market rhetoric seems intuitively out of place here, so inappropriate
that it is either silly, or somehow insulting to the value being discussed, or both.”).
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decisions to stay married as intimately intertwined with their
identity as a married person.131 Similarly, a will often
represents an individual’s final statement about her
relationships and her conception of how her property should be
distributed to her heirs.132 In the health-care context, a decision
to refuse life-sustaining treatment or donate an organ to a
relative might reflect intimate religious beliefs.133 The alleged
danger lies in the notion that delegation may come to dominate
our understanding of these types of decisions. If the law can
simply designate another to make these decisions for us, the
argument goes, then we may lose the exclusive sphere of
personal decision-making that allows us to construct our
identities and relationships with others.
In the context of personal decisions and incapacity, this
argument is unpersuasive. Invoking the personal nature of a
decision to justify a nondelegation rule confuses nondelegability
for nondecision. If a surrogate is prohibited from making a
decision for an incapacitated ward, this does not mean that a
personal decision is not being made. To the contrary,
nondelegation merely makes a decision in favor of a status quo
outcome, whatever that may be.134 The decision being made may
be obscured by the language courts use, but it is relatively easy
to identify upon closer inspection. In the case of divorce, the
status quo is the continuance of marriage, and thus the default
rule is anti-divorce. Likewise, prohibitions on delegation of the
decision to marry would maintain the status quo of being
single. In the case of wills, where the individual did not make a
will, the status quo is distribution of the estate by the state’s
rules of intestacy, and the default rule incorporates all the
values embedded in those rules.135
131

See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1181,
1213 (2005) (discussing how rituals such as marriage can come to transform identities).
132
See supra Part I.B.2.
133
See Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1063,
1132 (1993) (discussing the difficulties of a one-size-fits all organ transplantation
regime, given the diversity of religious belief).
134
The concept of default rules is pervasive in the law. See, e.g., Adrienne
Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010) (family law); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance
Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031 (2004) (inheritance
law); Melanie B. Leslie, Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L. REV.
67 (2005) (trust law); Nathalie Martin, Consumer Scams and the Elderly: Preserving
Independence Through Shifting Default Rules, 17 ELDER L.J. 1 (2009) (elder law).
135
The status quo could also change. Intestacy rules could be altered so that
all property escheats to the state upon death. The rule on withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment might specify that medical intervention will cease after $500,000 of public
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Whatever the status quo outcome might be, a flat
prohibition based on the personal nature of the decision
obscures the decision being made—and its associated
circumstances—from public inquiry. There is reason to be
suspicious of this approach, or at least to interrogate the status
quo outcomes in more depth. The personal nature of a decision
or situation is typically invoked as part of an exercise in
drawing a line between the public and private spheres, with
the personal located on the private side of the line. This
practice is not new, and the public-private distinction has a
storied history in the law.136 Several scholars have vigorously
attacked it, however, and for good reason. Legal realists point
out that the public and private are interconnected, and thus
many of the areas of law thought to be private in nature are in
fact regulated by publicly promulgated rules.137 Feminist legal
theorists emphasize that the distinction runs along gendered
lines, and that the private sphere is the site of various
injustices visited upon women, including domestic violence.138
Prohibiting regulation of, or court involvement in, the private
condones these injustices.139
Further, we can actually identify concrete harms that
might arise from a nondelegation rule. These dangers are most
salient in the health-care domain. Health-care decisions
represent exercises of capabilities to lead lives of length and
monies have been spent on the ward. Marriage could require that the marriage
contract be renegotiated every five years.
136
See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1982) (describing the historical evolution of
the public/private distinction in legal thought).
137
See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553,
585-86 (1930) (noting how ostensibly private contractual law is actually regulated
through public rules); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of Political
and Economic Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 168-69 (1935) (noting that the
government can induce private conduct through public policies such as taxation);
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 484-85 (1909) (noting how
ostensibly private contractual law is actually regulated through public rules).
138
See generally Catherine MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 100 (1989).
139
See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
STATE 95 (1989) (“[S]ince a woman’s problems are not hers individually but those of
women as a whole, they cannot be addressed except as a whole. In this analysis of
gender as a nonnatural characteristic of a division of power in society, the personal
becomes political.”); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 110-33
(1989) (analyzing the idea of separate spheres); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1563-70 (1983)
(critiquing the dichotomy between family and market). For a summary of the different
feminist critiques, see Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1, 10-43 (1992).
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good health. Imagine the harm that could befall wards who are
at the mercy of a prohibition on guardian decision-making in
health-care affairs. This would favor the status quo of
nontreatment (or existing treatment at the point of decisional
incapacity). While this might be salutary in some circumstances
(for instance, in preventing overmedication),140 more often it
would have disastrous consequences if the ward suffered from a
serious but treatable illness and was not already in a healthcare institution.141
Thus, the argument fails on its own terms. If the
damage is done simply by the decision being made by someone
who did not initially possess the right of decision, then
nondelegation fails to eliminate the harm. Nondelegation has
merely shifted the decision to the status quo outcome created by
the background legal framework. Indeed, it is more injurious to
personhood to allow a decision to be made by an impersonal
default rule, representing the majoritarian impulses of a given
society, rather than by a guardian, who is likely a family
member who knew the ward well and could express her wishes
more faithfully. In other words, capabilities are meant to be
individual expressions, not paternalistic defaults.
Even if there is some damage to personhood, however
conceived, the damage is minimized or eliminated by the fact
that such personal delegations take place in the context of
decisional incapacity. The individual lacking decisional capacity
cannot make, or needs assistance in making, the decision
herself, which requires that a surrogate assist in doing so.142
Thus, personal delegations could actually be viewed as

140

See Jan Ellen Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-Determination of the
Elderly in the Face of Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1818, 1871-72 (1992) (“Wards are frequently relegated to institutional settings
where they suffer from overmedication, physical restraints, and sensory deprivation for
the convenience of the staff and for the sake of minimizing costs.”).
141
Of course, we can also identify concrete harms that could flow from
nondelegation regimes in the areas of divorce and wills. For divorce, an abusive spouse could
continue to dissipate marital assets (leaving the ward destitute), while in wills,
inheritance could flow to an insolvent heir (frustrating the ward’s desire for her money
to go to family members and not creditors).
142
See Arthur Kuflik, The Inalienability of Autonomy, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
271, 275 (1984) (“[T]o say that autonomy cannot be alienated is not to deny that one
human being can be legitimately subject to the guardianship of another . . . .
Individuals who altogether lack, or have lost, the relevant capacities are prime
candidates for paternalistic intervention.”). In addition, delegations are revocable
transfers of decision-making authority, though failure to reacquire decisional capacity
makes them irrevocable for this set of individuals.
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promoting personhood, since they preserve the capabilities of
the person lacking decisional capacity.
III.

LEGAL REFORM

The proposal that flows from the analysis above is
simple but broad in scope. If a decision implicates fundamental
human capabilities and must be provided on an equal basis in
order to be provided adequately to all, it should be delegable.143
This proposal will almost certainly trouble those who are aware
of high-profile instances of agent and guardian abuse.144 Such
abuse undoubtedly exists and must be taken seriously, for in
many cases it may threaten the fundamental human capabilities
of those lacking decisional capacity.
This issue is not new, however, and we must be on
guard against instituting legal reforms on the basis of
anecdotal horror stories, as emotionally compelling as they
might be.145 While cases of abuse surely exist, we should not
presume that a surrogate would make decisions that would be
harmful to the ward’s interests in all, or even most, cases. As
these are often weighty decisions, surrogate decision-makers—
143

There may be cases in which permitting personal delegations for those
with cognitive impairments threatens the capabilities of others who are similarly
situated. See János Fiala-Butora, Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E. Lord, The
Democratic Life of the Union: Toward Equal Voting Participation for Europeans with
Disabilities, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (noting this potential dynamic with
respect to the delegation of voting). This important point reminds us that we must
pursue a careful analysis of the theoretical and practical tradeoffs involved in
constructing a personal delegations regime, particularly for different subgroups of
individuals with cognitive impairments. In other words, there might be decisional
domains in which personal delegations in practice do not achieve the normative goals
for which they are put in place.
144
See, e.g., MERYL GORDON, MRS. ASTOR REGRETS (2008) (detailing the
abuses Brooke Astor, wealthy philanthropist, suffered at the hands of her son during
the final years of her life).
145
Lawrence Frolik put it particularly well:
In the absence of “hard” data, both reformers and counter-reformers are free
to rally support for their positions by pointing to horror stories of individual
injustices. While emotionally compelling, these individual cases do not add up
to a sound policy argument. No guardianship system will operate flawlessly
and dispense justice to all at affordable prices. No particular outcome nor
even a series of bad outcomes can automatically be interpreted as evidence of
systemic problems. As with any system dependent on the actions, judgment,
and discretion of numerous actors, the guardianship system will always fail
some individuals. No matter how many reforms or counter-reforms are
enacted, no matter how the system is modified, there is no perfection on this
side of paradise.
Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When the Best Is the Enemy of the Good, 9
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 351 (1998).
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who are often family members with interests that are aligned
with their wards—would not take them lightly. In other words,
there is no reason to believe that surrogates would necessarily
divorce their wards or cut off life support on a whim. More
importantly, these stories alone certainly do not compel us to
disempower the class of individuals with cognitive
impairment.146
The essential question for the design of legal
institutions is whether these types of decisions are relevantly
different from those decisions already delegated, and thus,
whether they require different institutions or legal rules to
manage them. This part fleshes out how broader personal
delegations would work in the context of durable powers of
attorney and guardianship. It then provides a preliminary
analysis of the areas of divorce, willmaking, and health care.
A.

Durable Powers of Attorney

The background principle of agency law is that any
lawful act may be delegated to another.147 Nevertheless, agency
law has recognized an exception for a class of acts that require
“personal performance” because of public policy, statute, or
contract.148 While the requirement of personal performance of
146

It is, of course, an empirical question whether personal delegations would
lead to widespread abuse or not. If it was demonstrated that surrogate decision-makers
were consistently refusing to take personal decisions to allow their wards to actualize
their capabilities, not respecting their wards’ wishes, or expressly harming their wards’
interests through the use of personal decision-making authority, this would call into
question whether permitting personal delegations actually serves to promote the
capabilities, dignity, and human flourishing of people with cognitive impairments.
147
See FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 80 (2d ed.
1914) (“General rule—For any lawful purpose.—It is the general rule that an agency
may be created for the performance of any lawful act, and that whatever a person may
lawfully do, if acting in his own right and in his own behalf, he may lawfully delegate
to an agent.”).
148
This exception has taken different forms, although the content has
remained the same. For instance, the Restatement (Third) of Agency lists this exception
under the heading “Capacity to Act as a Principal”:
(3) If performance of an act is not delegable, its performance by an agent does
not constitute performance by the principal.
....
Comment:
c. Delegability. A person may delegate performance of an act if its legal
consequences for that person are the same whether the act is performed
personally or by another. If personal performance is required, performance by
an agent does not constitute performance by the principal.
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contractual terms should not be disturbed, statutes and judicial
interpretations of public policy should permit an individual to
delegate personal decision-making authority to an agent (or coagents) in advance through a springing durable power of
attorney.149 Such advance planning is desirable because the
principal is in the best position to select a trustworthy agent
who is knowledgeable about the principal’s beliefs and
preferences. In addition, it will avoid the more cumbersome
guardianship process, as a probate court will generally refuse
to appoint a guardian if it appears that a ward’s needs are wellserved by an attorney-in-fact.150
The current trend in crafting durable powers of attorney
is to require that particular “hot powers” be specifically
delegated in the instrument. Examples include the creation of a
trust,151 revocation of a trust,152 changing a life insurance

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04(3) & cmt. c (2006). Thus, the definition hinges
on “personal performance,” which is left undefined, except by way of an example
following the comment of a lawyer who is personally required to read certain
documents. Older Restatements were more explicit about what constituted
nondelegable acts. The first and second Restatements have identical language on this
point:
§ 17. What Acts are Delegable
A person privileged, or subject to a duty, to perform an act or accomplish a
result can properly appoint an agent to perform the act or accomplish the
result, unless public policy or the agreement with another requires personal
performance; if personal performance is required, the doing of the act by
another on his behalf does not constitute performance by him.
Comment:
a. For most purposes, a person can properly create a power in an agent to
achieve the same legal consequences by the performance of an act as if he
himself had personally acted.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 17 (1958); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 17
(1933).
149
The springing condition is decisional incapacity, and the durable power of
attorney would have to specify an acceptable method of such a determination, such as
certification by a physician. The question of whether delegation should be permitted
while an individual still has capacity is a question beyond the scope of this article. That
being said, immediately effective durable powers of attorney have several advantages
over the springing version. See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to
Guardianship: Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 7, 19-23 (2007).
150
See McCallie v. McCallie, 660 So. 2d 584, 586-87 (Ala. 1995); In re Isadora
R., 773 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (App. Div. 2004); In re Peery, 727 A.2d 539, 540 (Pa. 1999). But
see In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Blare, 589 N.W.2d 211, 214 (S.D. 1999).
151
See In re Estate of Kurrelmeyer, 895 A.2d 207, 211-12 (Vt. 2006).
152
See Muller v. Bank of Am., N.A., 12 P.3d 899, 904 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000);
First Union Nat’l Bank of Virginia v. Thomas, 37 Va. Cir. 35 (1995).
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beneficiary designation,153 or gifting away property.154 These
powers are considered “hot” because of their potential to alter
an existing estate plan or dissipate the property of the estate.155
The requirement that these powers be specifically delegated
acts both to protect principals from the inadvertent granting of
such powers but also to clarify that such powers are indeed
delegable.156 To assist principals in determining which powers
must be specifically delegated, one need only add to the list of
powers that require specific delegation contained in the
Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act.157
The personal decisions at issue here could certainly be
considered “hot,” although perhaps in a slightly different sense.
They may in some circumstances have the ability to affect the
principal’s estate plan, but they also have the potential to alter
the principal’s life plan, changing significant objectives or
social relationships that the ward had come to value. Given the
importance of these personal decisions, it is imperative that an
agent consult with the ward to discern whether there are any
preferences she might express that would inform surrogate
decision-making. Some commentators have suggested that this
be required of all “fundamental transactions” that occur under
a durable power of attorney, before or after the loss of
decisional capacity, and this approach is consistent with the
proposal here as well.158
Most states give attorneys-in-fact wider berth than
guardians, due to the fact that the principal has selected the
agent in advance and specifically delegated controversial

153

See Weaver v. Deverell, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579, at *17-18 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Oct. 26, 2011).
154
See King v. Bankerd, 492 A.2d 608, 612-13 (Md. 1985).
155
See Linda S. Whitton, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Striking a
Balance Between Autonomy and Protection, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 343, 348 (2008).
156
See id.
157
See UNIF. STATUTORY FORM POWER ATT’Y ACT § 1 (1988), 8b U.L.A. 191,
201(a) (2001) (requiring specific delegation for the creation, revocation, amendment, or
termination of a trust, making a gift, creating or changing a right of survivorship,
creating or changing a beneficiary designation, authorizing another person to exercise
authority granted to an agent, waiving the principal’s right to be a beneficiary of a joint
and survivor annuity, exercising fiduciary powers that the principal has authority to
delegate, and disclaiming or refusing an interest in property).
158
See Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing Hidden
Abuses of Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 42-51 (2006) (outlining
such a proposal); see also Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):
Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 237-39 (2010) (discussing
“representation agreements” in Canada, which have a similar flavor).
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powers.159 Regardless of the specific regime a state might adopt for
attorneys-in-fact as a whole, it is imperative that the nature of the
fiduciary relationship be clear, so as to provide guidance to those
agents and provide guidelines for evaluating potential abuse.160
B.

Guardianship
1. Guardianship Regimes

For those who have not planned in advance, the state
should be permitted to delegate personal decision-making
authority to a guardian. This system of expanded personal
delegations should be accompanied by other reforms, however,
to ensure that these delegations do not serve to aggrandize the
power of guardians at the expense of wards. This is a real
problem, especially because the United States relies too heavily
on a plenary model of guardianship, where there is little
tailoring of guardianship to specific decisional incapacities. This
concern might be addressed, in part, by preserving (or explicitly
adopting by statute) the current capacity requirement for many
types of personal decisions, which is relatively low.161 Thus, an
individual retains the capacity to make these decisions after
losing other types of decisional capacity, and despite being
placed under plenary guardianship.162 This protects the ward’s
control over this important class of decisions, though it most
159

Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of
Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 42-48 (2001) (discussing reforms in various
states, which range from requiring that a durable power of attorney be recorded to
enabling third parties to police attorneys-in-fact in various ways).
160
See id.; Carolyn Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial Durable Power
of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574, 587 (1996) (calling for clarity on
the attorney-in-fact’s duty to act).
161
While there are certainly cases in which it is clear that a person lacks
capacity for a decision, there is often a large grey area as well. This is especially true
for progressive conditions, in which a person’s capacity may vary day to day or for
whom there may be periods of lucidity alternating with periods of clear incapacity.
162
See In re Estate of Romero, 126 P.3d 228, 231 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (“The
appointment of a conservator or guardian is not a determination of testamentary
incapacity of the protected person.”); Hoffman v. Kohns, 385 So. 2d 1064, 1068-69 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (nullifying will while upholding marriage of senile man who
married his housekeeper and then wrote a will a day later); In re Nelson, 891 S.W.2d
181, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (“The existence of a conservatorship does not necessarily
preclude the capacity to make a will.”); see also Lawrence A. Frolik & Mary F. Radford,
“Sufficient” Capacity: The Contrasting Capacity Requirements for Different Documents,
2 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’YS J. 303, 305 (2006) (“If legal capacity lies along a
spectrum, testamentary capacity is at the lower end.”); Warren F. Gorman,
Testamentary Capacity in Alzheimer’s Disease, 4 ELDER L.J. 225, 234-35 (1996) (noting
that one may retain testamentary capacity in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease).
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certainly does not eliminate the situations in which a ward has
clearly lost decisional capacity and cannot make those decisions
for herself.
The other way to address this concern would be to shift
to a guardianship system that is more supportive of ward
decision-making and is less totalizing.163 Other countries, such
as Sweden and Japan, have structured their guardianship
systems to make the surrogate more of a mentor or assistant,
rather than a substitute decision-maker.164 These approaches best
safeguard the capabilities of those with cognitive impairments, as
they try to facilitate choice in various life domains.
Nevertheless, while this type of reform would be ideal, several
intermediate and perhaps more attainable steps would still
enhance the capabilities of people with disabilities under
guardianship in the United States. There have been a host of
proposals over the past thirty years, some of which have
enjoyed modest success in various states. These include
continuing to foster limited guardianships and defining
incapacity in a domain-specific way (so as not to infringe on
areas in which wards still retain decisional capacity),165
instituting mediation techniques to adjudicate guardianship
petitions (which may allow more flexible and creative solutions
to problems of decisional incapacity within families),166 and
restricting emergency guardianships.167
2. Guarding the Guardians
While guardianship reforms and increased personal
delegations address the basic need to recognize the dignity of
163

See Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to
Guardianship?, 117 PENN. STATE L. REV. 1111, 1120-28 (2013) (proposing such a system).
164
See Stanley S. Herr, Self-Determination, Autonomy, and Alternatives for
Guardianship, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES:
DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 431-35 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003) (describing the “god
man,” who acts more as an assistant than a plenary guardian); Israel Doron, Elder
Guardianship Kaleidoscope—A Comparative Perspective, 16 INT’L J.L., POL’Y & FAM.
368, 376 (2002) (describing the “hojonin,” or helper, for those who suffer from milder
forms of intellectual disability, and with whom various decisions are jointly made with
the ward).
165
See generally Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a
Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 654-55 (1981).
166
See Mary F. Radford, Is the Use of Mediation Appropriate in Adult
Guardianship Cases?, 31 STETSON L. REV. 611 (2002).
167
See Jamie L. Leary, Note, A Review of Two Recently Reformed
Guardianship Statutes: Balancing the Need to Protect Individuals Who Cannot Protect
Themselves Against the Need to Guard Individual Autonomy, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
245, 259 (1997).

2013]

PERSONAL DELEGATIONS

1271

people with disabilities and facilitate their decisions, the
following question still remains: what degree of oversight
should govern the individuals or entities to whom personal
decision-making authority is delegated? In other words, how do
we guard the guardians? The guardian is the ward’s agent,
subject to the requirements of fiduciary law as well as
monitoring by the appointing court.168 She must file initial and
annual reports about the ward, and she is subject to removal for
mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty.169 Any interested
person, including the ward, may petition the court for removal of
the guardian or modification of the guardian’s powers.170
This level of oversight represents the baseline, and it is
not particularly stringent.171 The court can also require an
additional layer of oversight—namely, by requiring that the
guardian receive advance judicial approval for certain types of
actions.172 This type of oversight is generally compulsory for
“hot powers” in the financial realm whenever there is a high
likelihood of decisional error. This risk of decisional error,
combined with the importance of these decisions, justifies
further oversight because of the potential harm to the ward.
One way to recognize the potential risk of error is where a
conflict of interest arises between the guardian and her ward.
In fact, this is the operating principle for oversight in the law of
trusts, where a trustee must secure advance judicial approval
168

See Lawrence A. Frolik, Is the Guardian the Alter Ego of the Ward?, 37
STETSON L. REV. 53, 85-86 (2007) (noting that the guardians, statutory surrogates, and
agents acting under a durable power of attorney have the same responsibilities and
fiduciary requirements).
169
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-22 (West 2012) (requiring the filing of an
initial report within 60 days); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12 (2011) (requiring an
annual report). These reports are generally read by judges, court staff, or outside
experts, though sometimes they are not read at all due to poor funding of the
guardianship system. See Sally Balch Hurme & Erica Wood, Guardian Accountability
Then and Now: Tracing Tenets for an Active Court Role, 31 STETSON L. REV. 867, 90411 (2002).
170
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-307(1) (West 2012) (“On petition of the
ward or any person interested in the ward’s welfare, the court may remove a guardian
and appoint a successor if in the best interests of the ward.”). However, many states
have still not implemented standards for guardian conduct and ethics, and many that
have do not apply these standards to family guardians, making it difficult to know or
punish breaches of fiduciary duty. See generally Karen E. Boxx & Terry W. Hammond,
A Call for Standards: An Overview of the Current Status and Need for Guardian
Standards of Conduct and Codes of Ethics, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1207 (2012).
171
But see Hurme & Wood, supra note 169, at 901 (arguing that the
requirement of filling out reports can have a “sentinel effect” by making guardians
aware that the court will hold them accountable).
172
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3725 (West 2012) (outlining the procedure
for authorization of “extraordinary authority”).
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to engage in a conflicted transaction.173 The presence of a
conflict of interest is concerning because it suggests that the
decision being made could harm the ward. That is, the
decisions will represent the interests of the surrogate decisionmaker rather than the ward, which may be problematic
because it ignores the past preferences or present interests of
the ward. Thus, the presence of a conflict serves as a red flag
that a bad decision might be coming down the pipeline.174
In one sense, family guardians making surrogate
decisions are likely to be free from serious conflicts. Familial
ties will often (although not always) create an alignment of
interests between the family guardian and the ward. In other
words, the family guardian will benefit psychologically when the
ward’s known preferences are satisfied or when the ward is
doing well. At the same time, family guardians may find
themselves in conflicted positions. For example, their financial
position may change through the exercise of a personal decision
that impacts how the ward’s resources will be distributed at
death. Similarly, family guardians are also caregivers and may
view their duties as imposing a cost more than bestowing a
benefit. As a result, they may exercise personal decisionmaking authority to minimize their care duties rather than
implement the ward’s preferences or safeguard the ward’s
interests. Finally, family guardians may have preexisting
opinions or resentments about the ward’s personal decisions
about her body, identity, or intimate associations, and they
may wish to reverse those decisions if given the power to do so.
On the other hand, professional guardians are unlikely to be
conflicted in the same way, although they may have incentives
to make personal decisions in a manner that maximizes profits
or implements their social missions. The presence of these
incentives may also put them at odds with the ward’s
preferences or interests.
A standard conflict-of-interest analysis may not capture
the entire universe of decisions that should be subject to
173

See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole
Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 965-67 (2005) (explaining how the judicial
approval mechanism derives from the equitable “petition for instructions”).
174
The presence of a conflict does not necessarily mean that a particular
decision-maker should be disqualified or is a poor choice for the job. See Adrian
Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122 YALE L. J.
384, 389-90 (2012) (arguing that conflicts of interest should not immediately foreclose
delegation of decision-making authority and must be balanced against the benefits of
delegating to that particular entity).
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judicial review in a personal delegations regime. This stems
from the fact that conflicts are more likely to take nonpecuniary
forms in the context of surrogate decision-making on personal
matters. Thus, they are harder to detect and regulate. Courts
should try to detect these hidden conflicts by examining the
exercise of decision-making authority under the substituted
judgment or best interests standards. For example, a
surrogate’s decision may imply a preference for an outcome
that is unlikely to have been held by the ward because a strong
consensus favors a status quo outcome in a wide range of likely
circumstances.175 Under substituted judgment, this should be a
red flag that a hidden conflict of interest might be at work. In
other words, because it is highly unlikely that a ward would
have exercised decision-making authority in the same way
herself, the surrogate’s exercise of authority is suspect.
Alternatively, under a best interests analysis, a court should
suspect the exercise of personal decision-making authority by a
surrogate when there are few situations one can imagine in which
taking such a decision would advance the ward’s interests.
Consider the decision to marry. In normal
circumstances, most wards probably would not wish for their
guardians to marry them off to someone while they lacked
capacity. Assuming that marriage is more of an individual as
opposed to a familial or cultural choice, it is difficult to imagine
circumstances in which it would advance the objective interests
175

The range of likely circumstances must include possible changed
circumstances, which can take many forms. Something might change in the ward’s
immediate situation that might lead to a need for a decision to be made. This is
clearest in the health-care arena, as it is difficult to predict one’s health status in
advance, given unknown genetics and environmental factors. See Einer Elhauge,
Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1479 (1994) (“[I]n contrast to
other needs, the need for health care is unpredictable.”). Something might change
about the situations of persons for whom the ward cared or would care that could be
considered under an expanded best interests analysis. In fact, this is the type of
situation that birthed the substituted judgment doctrine. Ex parte Whitbread involved
a wealthy but decisionally incapable man, and his niece who requested some portion of
his estate to which she was not legally entitled. [1816] 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch.) 878-79.
The Chancellor decided to give her some portion of the estate, reasoning that the man
would not have wanted his relations to be beggars and bring disrepute to his family.
See id. at 879-80; see also Harmon, supra note 108, at 19. Finally, something might
change about the context in which the ward operates that would create a desire to
make a decision in a given personal domain. A state legislature or Congress may alter
one of the default rules in a decisional domain, or the legal effect of a preexisting
decision. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 633, 712-24 (2004) (describing the debates over means-tested public benefits
programs, which often lead to changes in eligibility criteria). Alternatively, a
technological change may alter the option set for wards, which is a common occurrence
in the health-care arena.
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of a ward to marry another person. Thus, the court should
review this exercise of surrogate decision-making authority
with suspicion, although there may be scenarios where a
surrogate’s exercise of the right to marry would be justified.176
While conflicts of interest or suspect exercises of
decision-making authority call for judicial review, the question
whether courts have the institutional competence to review
such decisions remains.177 For financial transactions that
require advance judicial approval, the court has some ability to
sort through the evidence to determine whether an action is
appropriate. For instance, a judge is fully competent to
determine whether giving gifts out of the estate is consistent
with practices before incapacity or if it will have positive
benefits from a tax law perspective. The same is not necessarily
true of many of these personal decisions, since the preferences
underlying them may be idiosyncratic or unrevealed, and the
objective interests of the ward may be difficult to ascertain.
This is not to say that courts lack all evaluative capacity, but it
does suggest that a more deferential posture might be
appropriate when evaluating petitions for advance judicial
approval of most types of personal decision-making.178
176

For example, an individual who is on the way to her wedding might suffer
an accident. It is quite possible that such a ward would desire her incapacitated self to
be married off by her guardian to her intended spouse, if the spouse was still willing.
Thus, the decision to marry, even taken by a surrogate, would be justified under a
substituted judgment approach. It may even be justifiable under a broader best interests
test. See Whitton & Frolik, supra note 105, at 1512 (describing how an expanded best
interests model “may include consideration of consequences for significant others if a
reasonable person might ordinarily consider such consequences.”). In this type of
analysis, it would be appropriate to take into account the spouse-to-be’s interests in
fulfilling the promise of marriage. Another scenario might involve a same-sex couple
that desired to get married but did not live in a state that allowed same-sex marriage
until one member of the couple lacked decisional capacity. Having a guardian authorize
such a marriage would be justified using the same reasoning described above. The
factual circumstances that would justify the exercise of marital decision-making
authority are certainly rare though. Not many people suffer from accidents on their
wedding day or become cognitively impaired before they acquire the right to marry.
177
The institutional competence literature traditionally compares courts to
other governmental institutions, such as administrative agencies or the elected
branches. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A
Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest
Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941 (1999);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope of
Judicial Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 296 (1993). The comparator here is different—a
surrogate decision-maker who is usually a family member—but such a surrogate may
have distinct advantages over judges in knowledge of the ward’s preferences and the
ward’s current situation.
178
See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 53-54 (2007) (discussing deference in the
context of agency action and inaction); Kathryn Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing
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Preliminary Applications

This subpart will examine personal delegations in the
three illustrative areas discussed earlier. The aim is to
establish a process for evaluating different decisional domains
and sketch out the contours of personal delegations regimes in
the domains of divorce, wills, and health care in particular.
The first step in assessing a decisional domain is to
evaluate whether the decision falls into the set of those deemed
personal by the particular normative theory being applied. This
article employs the capabilities approach as its primary
normative theory, and the three decisions at issue are connected
to fundamental human capabilities.179 The second step is to
evaluate which delegation mechanisms would be appropriate
and, specifically, whether the mechanism of statutory surrogacy
is warranted because emergency decisions must be made. The
third step is to evaluate the likelihood that conflicts will arise for
common decision-makers in each domain, who will most often be
family members although increasingly may be nonprofit,
private, or public guardians. Finally, one must take into
account any special features of the domain that might impact
the analysis.
1. Divorce
While there are certainly harms that might be
associated with continuing marriage, they are not necessarily
of a type that would require an emergency divorce. This is
because several legal mechanisms exist to deal with the most
harmful of abusive situations, at least on a temporary basis.180
Thus, statutory surrogacy is unnecessary in the divorce
domain, as surrogate decision-making can be handled through
durable powers of attorney and guardianship.
Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583 (2011) (same). Another way of preventing abuse would be to
change the burden of proof for the surrogate decision-maker who desired to make a
personal decision for the ward. As noted earlier, this has been the strategy in some
states with regard to withdrawals of life-sustaining treatment. See supra Part I.B.3.
179
See generally supra Part I.B. It is likely that all three decisions would be
considered personal under a substituted judgment approach, but the best interests
approach might encompass a narrower range of personal decisions, depending on the
theory of welfare used.
180
See generally Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of
Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of civil protection orders to prevent
domestic violence).
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An advance delegation through a durable power of
attorney should specifically authorize the divorce decision as
well as the ability to self-deal. Surrogates may benefit from a
divorce action, especially if they are adult children who would
be entitled to a larger inheritance if their parents were
divorced. On the other hand, if no conflicts are present, judicial
approval is likely unnecessary since various factual situations
might justify divorce, such as abuse or the need to segregate
assets in order to qualify for certain public benefits programs.181
These circumstances sometimes lead individuals with
decisional capacity to seek a strategic “Medicaid divorce” to
separate assets from their spouse and establish eligibility for
Medicaid or other public assistance programs.182 Moreover,
advance judicial approval is superfluous because a divorce
action already takes place within the context of a legal
proceeding, where the other party most affected by the divorce
decision—namely, the spouse—is already involved. As such,
the spouse will be on notice and can raise arguments about the
guardian’s impropriety with the probate court if necessary.
2. Wills
As with divorce, there is likely no situation that would
require an emergency willmaking, so delegation should be
permitted only in advance by durable power of attorney or
through guardianship after decisional incapacity strikes. If a
durable power of attorney specifically granted the power to craft
a will and permitted self-dealing with respect to willmaking,
then no advance judicial approval should be required.
Guardianship, however, presents a different scenario.
Many family guardians will have conflicts of interest by virtue
181

For example, consider Medicaid, which funds a substantial amount of the
country’s long-term health care. See LAURA SUMMER, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LONG-TERM
CARE FIN. PROJECT, MEDICAID & LONG-TERM CARE (Jan. 2007), available at
http://ltc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/medicaid2006.pdf. As a means-tested program, Medicaid
takes account of an individual’s income and assets to see if they qualify for assistance.
Id. As recently as 2005, Congress changed the eligibility criteria for Medicaid, making
its provisions more stringent for those who gave away assets in order to qualify. See
Monica J. Franklin, How the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 Affects Medicaid Recipients,
42 TENN. B.J., May 2006, at 18-19 (describing how the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
increased the Medicaid look-back period for gift-giving to sixty months).
182
See Lee Anne Fennell, Relative Burdens: Family Ties and the Safety Net,
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1453, 1457-58 (2004) (describing the phenomenon of Medicaid
divorce as a strategic choice for managing caregiving burdens); Hal Fliegelman &
Debora C. Fliegelman, Giving Guardians the Power to Do Medicaid Planning, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 341, 359-61, 364 (1997) (same).
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of their status as potential heirs, suggesting that advance
judicial approval should be required. Despite this, a guardian’s
exercise of willmaking authority is not inherently suspect
because a nontrivial number of testators may have preferences
for disposition of assets that vary from the intestacy rules, and
certain circumstances may warrant willmaking for estate
planning purposes. Moreover, the court likely possesses
sufficient competence to review evidence of the ward’s prior
wishes and assess the tax or other legal advantages to crafting
a will. Accordingly, no particular deference is owed to the
guardian decision-maker.
Delegation of authority in the willmaking context would
also have the benefit of harmonizing the peculiar situation that
currently exists within trusts and estates law, where wills and
will substitutes are treated differently for purposes of
delegation despite being functionally identical. Indeed, the
creation of a trust arguably has a more immediate effect on an
estate, since it transfers assets from the probate estate during
the ward’s lifetime, whereas the will’s power is only exercised
at the death of the ward. If guardians have access to the former
tool, then providing access to the latter for estate planning
purposes would not mark a revolutionary change.
3. Health Care
Health care is a broad domain that encompasses a wide
variety of decisions regarding medical care and treatment.
Medical emergencies are common enough that this domain
requires a mechanism for the clear and rapid designation of a
surrogate decision-maker. This feature explains and justifies
why surrogacy statutes arose in the health-care domain,
although these statutes can also be complemented by other
legal delegation mechanisms, such as the health-care power of
attorney or guardianship.
For most of the decisions in this domain, family
guardians are unlikely to be conflicted because they lack
incentives to restrict ward treatment and likely wish to extend
the life and health of the ward. There is also nothing inherently
suspect about the exercise of decision-making authority in this
domain, since most wards would actually prefer treatment to
nontreatment. Conflicts may arise, however, in the case of lifeor-death decisions, since death triggers a series of legal
consequences, such as inheritance. Normally, this would imply
that advance judicial approval should be required for these

1278

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

decisions. The health-care domain is unique, however, in that
the decisions that compose it are already subject to oversight by
the medical profession. It is therefore unclear that adding an
additional layer of judicial review would add anything except
additional process. On the other hand, if there is reason to
believe that the medical profession is insufficiently protective
of the ward’s capabilities for certain decisions, then judicial
intervention may be appropriate. In addition, if there is a
conflict among family members, or if members of the medical
profession request judicial intervention, then the court should
adjudicate the matter, with proper deference to the designated
decision-maker.
CONCLUSION
Many of us will have personal experience with
decisional incapacity during our lifetime, either by acquiring
cognitive impairments as we age or serving as a surrogate for
someone who needs assistance. These abilities to receive and
provides care are currently inhibited by legal doctrines that
sever people with cognitive impairments from decisions that
inhere in their fundamental human capabilities. This article
has critiqued the use of the concept of the personal to justify a
nondelegation rule in the case of decisional incapacity.
Personal delegations should be permitted through private or
public mechanisms, accompanied by reforms of guardianship
and judicial review in cases where conflicts of interest are
present or the exercise of decision-making authority is
inherently suspect. These issues cannot be avoided or ignored,
and our institutional legal structures must adapt to the sociolegal changes inherent in personal delegations law.

